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Introduction 
The biotechnology industry emerged for more than 30 years ago. Since then, more than 100 
drugs have been launched, and thereby, improved the quality of life for millions of people 
(Miller, 2003; Walsh, 2006). Biotechnology is a field of applied biology (e.g. genetics, 
microbiology, biochemistry and cell biology) that involves the use of living organisms in 
engineering, technology and medicine. The basic idea was that through improved technology 
and a better understanding of biological processes, the R&D process would become more 
efficient, faster, less risky and cheaper (Pisano, 2006). Biotechnology companies are, also, 
playing an increasingly important role in drug development.
1
 While the general business 
model of pharmaceutical firms has changed considerably in recent years, future innovations 
and medical treatments to various diseases are likely to move towards the reliance of biotech 
firms. 
From the financial perspective, biologic products (called biologics) are accounting for a 
growing share of drug revenues. In 2006, sales of biologics were $40 billion in the US and the 
annual growth between 2001 and 2006 was 20%, which is particularly remarkable compared 
with the 6-8% annual growth rate of the US pharmaceutical market (Aggarwal, 2007). 
Recently, it has been argued that the six biggest-selling drugs in 2014 will be biologics. 
However, the historical financial performance has primarily been driven by relatively few 
firms. In 2004, fifteen biotech companies represented 93% of total sales, of which two 
companies (Amgen and Genentech) accounted for 53% of total sales in the US sector (Pisano, 
2006). Indeed, the vast majority of biotech firms are still young and at a developmental stage. 
Hence, most biotech firms are cash-flow negative. 
The core business of biotech firms is to engage in research and development of drugs. The 
drug development process consists of different stages, which are linked to each other. These 
different stages are broadly classified as: discovery, pre-clinical, clinical phase I, clinical 
phases II, clinical phase III, and regulatory review (see Appendix 1). The movement from one 
stage to the next must be built on the success of the previous stage. In addition, regulatory 
authorities closely monitor the drug development process and the movement from one stage 
to the next must be approved by these regulatory authorities (such as the EMA in Europe and 
the FDA in the US).  
                                                 
1 Biotechnology companies engaged in drug development is commonly referred to as biopharmaceutical (henceforth: 
biotech) companies. 
   
Drug development is certainly a long and expensive process. The length of the development 
life cycle for a successful product is usually between 10-15 years and the costs of developing 
a drug exceed $800 million (Kaitin, 2003). The high uncertainty in drug development has 
immediate implications on the financial statements of biotech firms. Large investments in 
intangibles, such as R&D, are generally expensed as they occur and are less frequently 
capitalized. In addition, sales revenues are generally low (or even zero) because few firms 
have marketable products. As a result, bottom-line net income is usually (large) negative. In 
the balance sheet, few intangible assets are capitalized, and the asset side is generally 
dominated by cash and cash equivalents, which firms’ burn at a high pace. Although biotech 
firms hold substantial growth opportunities, banks generally do not provide loans due to the 
absence of assets in place (Tan and Lim, 2007) . Therefore, biotech firms are generally 100 
percent equity-financed. To finance large investments in R&D, biotech firm managers have to 
turn to capital markets in order to sustain operations. 
 
Research problems 
From a valuation perspective, accounting information is only value-relevant if the future 
resembles the past. However, for firms in R&D intensive industries, such as the 
biotechnology, accounting information is a poor indicator of firm value. McConomy and Xu 
(2004) suggest that non-accounting information, such as clinical trial results, are key drivers 
of value and better indicators of a firm’s future earnings potential. Studying the stock 
market’s reaction to clinical trial results has two major advantages. First, disclosures of R&D 
information for biotech firms are generally mandatory and unbiased. Security laws require 
firms to disclose price-sensitive information as soon as possible and, thereby, limits the ability 
of firms to manage and time corporate disclosures. Second, regulatory authorities heavily 
regulate and monitor the drug development process. Firms work in close collaboration in the 
design of clinical trials with the regulatory authorities, and have pre-defined goals. As a 
result, disclosures are generally non-discretionary. In this setting with the regulatory authority 
as a gatekeeper, events are rather exogenous. Hence, this environment overcomes the 
common criticism of the presence of endogenous events in the event study literature (Schultz, 
2003, Viswanathan and Wei, 2008).  
The first research paper uses a unique hand-collected dataset of all publicly listed firms in the 
European biotechnology industry from 1998-2009, and examines how the stock market 
   
responds to when uncertainty is resolved at different stages. For example, how does the 
market react when a project is allowed to enter clinical trials? Is there a difference in the 
market’s reaction between different type of announcements (e.g., phase I, phase II and phase 
III), between announcements of positive and negative results, and between different type of 
companies? 
 
The biotech industry is, arguably, different from other industries in the sense that firms 
usually operate with large negative free cash flows, and they have no other choice but to 
regularly ask investors for (equity) financing of their research projects. Studying market 
timing and external financing decisions for a sample of biotech firms has two advantages. 
First, external financing is not a choice between debt or equity, but only equity (Guo and 
Mech, 2000). Second, while earnings announcements are biased in the case that managers 
deliberately disclose information that is at their advantage, i.e. earnings announcements can 
be manipulated, R&D announcements are credible announcement news and are, generally, not 
subject to manipulation. However, when to access the capital markets is a balancing act that 
depends on both firm- and market-specific factors. 
An example of market timing is exemplified by the following paragraph from a press release 
on March 23, 2010, for the French biotech firm Transgene, which went public in 1998: “In 
light of its net cash position at December 31, 2009, of €64.7 million, the Company is able to 
determine the timing of the fund raising and its announcement when it deems the conditions 
most appropriate”. 
While the primary motive to issue new equity is driven by a need to sustain operations, this 
study examines the incremental effect whether firms’ access capital markets when investors 
understand the firm’s prospects better (i.e., the information asymmetry between investors and 
management is low), or whether the equity issue decision is driven by the belief that managers 
see a “window-of-opportunity” in the market. Credible R&D announcement disclosures are 
used in this study as a measure of the information asymmetry. 
 
Data and methodology 
The two research papers are based on a sample of 87 publicly listed European biotechnology 
firms between 1998 and 2010. The first research paper uses a complete sample of 1,089 R&D 
   
announcements made by all publicly biotechnology firms between 1998 and 2009. The 
information related to R&D announcements is primarily hand-collected from corporate 
websites. The methodology in the first research paper is the standard event study 
methodology (e.g. MacKinlay, 1997). Event studies using short event windows are often 
referred to as information content studies (Francis and Shipper, 1999). Stock exchange 
regulations require firms to disclose “price sensitive” information as soon as possible on their 
corporate website. Since R&D announcements in the biotechnology industry are mandatory, 
the corporate website is the most reliable source of information. 
In the second research paper, equity issue data of 232 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) made 
by European biotech firms is used. The data is collected from corporate websites, annual 
reports and the Thomson Reuters Knowledge Database. This study uses 561 R&D 
announcements from the first research paper. The methodology employed is a probit model, 
in which the probability of an equity issue is explained using firm- and market-specific 
variables. 
 
The European biotechnology industry 
The European biotech industry is considerably smaller than the US biotech industry in terms 
of number of firms, number of employees, products and market capitalization (Bains, 2006). 
In addition, the industry is relatively young, compared to its US counterpart. The Swedish 
company, Active Biotech, which went public in December 1986, is the oldest European 
biotechnology firm.
2
 However, the number of European biotech firms has increased 
substantially over time. In 1998, the total number of European publicly listed biotech firms 
were 22, of which 12 were from the UK. The sector has grown during especially two IPO 
windows; in 2000 when 12 firms went public, and, between 2004 and 2006 when the sector 
grew from 47 to 73 firms. As of 2010, the sector consists of 76 active biotech firms, of which 
they are distributed per region as follows: Scandinavia- 18, United Kingdom 20, French 17, 
and, German 21
3
. These firms are listed on the following stock exchanges: Vienna Stock 
Exchange (Austria), Copenhagen Stock Exchange (Denmark), Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(Finland), Euronext Paris (France), Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Germany), Milano Stock 
Exchange (Italy), Euronext Amsterdam (the Netherlands), Oslo Stock Exchange (Norway), 
                                                 
2 Active Biotech (or originally Active), was founded in 1983, and became a pure biotechnology company in 1997, 
when operations were to concentrate on biotechnology. 
3 Classification according to La Porta et al (1998).  
   
OMX Stockholm (Sweden), Swiss Stock Exchange (Switzerland), and, London Stock 
Exchange/Alternative Investment Market (United Kingdom). 
Bains (2006) argues that the cause of the relatively immature European biotech industry is 
because of low investment levels; the sector receives smaller amounts of funding, and less 
funding per company compared to US biotech firms. In contrast, Fazeli (2005) suggests that 
the cause of the less successful European biotech industry is not due to that there is not 
enough cash available that is needed to bring products to market, but rather due to fragmented 
equity market. 
In the sample period 1998 to 2009, 57 firms went public raising a total of €2,512 million or 
€46.5 million per firm (not tabulated). The three largest IPOs were all made in 2000: Genmab 
raised €209.6, Actelion €165.6, and, Crucell €144.0 million, respectively. In total, 232 SEOs 
have raised equity capital worth €6,536 million4. Firms with Scandinavian-origin have raised 
most equity capital, totaling €2.00 billion in 65 equity issues (i.e. €30.81 million per issue). 
Firms with English-origin have made the largest number of equity issues; 86, with a total 
value of €1.77 billion (i.e. €20.56 million per issue). The largest amount per issue has been 
made by French-origin biotech firms: €47.96 million per issue. There is a substantial variation 
over time, both in terms of the number of issuing firms and the size of their equity issues. 
While the average size of gross issue proceeds has been €28.2 million, the lowest annual 
average is €6.9 million (1999) and the highest is €50.1 million (2007). Finally, the value of 
the equity proceeds also varies substantially and it is determined by both the number of 
issuing firms and the value of their issues. As a consequence the sum of the proceeds per firm 
is €18.4 million in 2007, €3.2 million in 2008, only to be followed by €15.7 million in 2009.  
                                                 
4 A SEO is a new equity issue made by an already publicly listed firm. 
   
Appendix 1. The drug development process 
 (i) Discovery research and pre-clinical research 
The first stage in the drug development process is discovery research. The objective of this 
stage is to identify one or more active chemical or biological substances with the desired 
effect and drugable potential. In preclinical research, selected candidate drugs from discovery 
research are tested in animals. The primary goal is to determine whether the identified drug 
can be administered to humans. Discovery research and the pre-clinical phase usually take 3-5 
years to complete (Active Biotech, Annual Report 2009). A company files an investigational 
new drug (IND) application with national regulatory authorities, to request permission to 
initiate testing of the drug on humans.
5
 
(ii) Clinical phase I 
In clinical phase I trials, the candidate drug is tested in a group of healthy volunteers (20 - 80). 
The purpose is to evaluate its safety and determine safe dosing ranges. Phase I usually takes 1 
to 1.5 year(s) to complete and costs between €5.4 and €8.1 million. (Active Biotech, Annual 
Report 2009; Keegan, 2008) On average, only 10-20% of drugs at this phase reach the market 
(Bogdan and Villiger, 2008). 
(iii) Clinical phase II 
In clinical phase II trials, the drug is tested on patients suffering from the target disorder. The 
trials usually encompass 100 to 300 patients. Clinical phase II can take from 1 to 2 years and 
costs between €10.8 and €21.6 million to complete. (Active Biotech, Annual Report 2009; 
Keegan, 2008) About 30% of drugs at this stage reach the market (Bogdan and Villiger, 
2008). 
(iv) Clinical phase III 
In clinical phase III trials, the drug is given to large groups of patients (1,000 – 3,000), and 
intends to confirm its safety, monitor potential side effects, and measure efficacy in relation to 
commonly used treatments (if any exist). Clinical phase III usually takes 2 to 4 years and 
costs between €27.1 and €54.1 million. (Active Biotech, Annual Report 2009; Keegan, 2008) 
After successful results, the company will submit an NDA (“New Drug Application”) or BLA 
                                                 
5 The IND includes detailed information on the structure of the trials the company intends to use for testing the 
drug.   
   
(“Biologics License Application”) to a regulatory authority for regulatory review. 
Approximately 50-75% of drugs at this stage are approved (Bogdan and Villiger, 2008). 
 
  
   
References 
Aggarwal, S., 2007. What’s fueling the biotech engine? Nature Biotechnology 25, 1097-1104. 
Bains, W., 2006. What you give is what you get: Investment in European biotechnology. 
Journal of Commercial Biotechnology 12, 274-283. 
Bogdan, B, Villiger, R., 2008. Valuation in life sciences. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Fazeli, S., 2005. The European biotech sector: Could it achieve more?. Journal of Commercial 
Biotechnology 12, 10-19. 
Francis, J., Schipper, K., 1999. Have financial statements lost their relevance? Journal of 
Accounting Research 37, 319-352. 
Guo, L., Mech, T. S., 2000. Conditional event studies, anticipation, and asymmetric 
information: The case of seasoned equity issues and pre-issue information releases. Journal of 
Empirical Finance 7, 113-141. 
Kaitin, K. I., 2003. Post-approval R&D raises total drug developments costs to $897 million. 
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Impact Report 5(3). 
Keegan, K, 2008. Biotechnology valuation: An introductory guide. West Sussex: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
MacKinlay, C. A., 1997. Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic 
Literature 35, 13-39. 
McConomy, B., Xu, B., 2004. Value creation in the biotechnology industry. CMA 
Management, 29-31. 
Miller, H. I., 2002. As biotech turns 20. Nature Review of Drug Discovery 1, 1007-1008. 
Pisano, G. P., 2006. Science Business: The promise, the reality, and the future of biotech. 
Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Robbins-Roth, C., 2001. From alchemy to IPO: The business of biotechnology. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Schultz, P., 2003. Pseudo market timing and the long-run underperformance of IPOs. Journal 
of Finance 58, 483-517. 
   
Tan, P. M-S., Lim, C. Y., 2007. The value relevance of accounting variables and analysts’ 
forecasts: The case of biotechnology firms. Review of Accounting and Finance 6, 233-253. 
Viswanathan, S., Wei, B., 2008. Endogenous events and long-run returns. Review of 
Financial Studies 21, 855-888. 
Walsh, G., 2006. Biopharmaceutical benchmarks 2006. Nature Biotechnology 24, 769-776.  
   
 
The Value Relevance of Research Progress in 
the European Biotechnology Industry 
 
 
Hans Jeppsson
*
 
 
University of Gothenburg, School of Business, Economics and Law 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, the stock market’s reaction to the progress of individual research projects is 
examined. The study is based on hand-collected data of all publicly listed companies in the 
European biotechnology industry from 1998–2009. The study shows that a stock market 
reacts more strongly to late-stage announcements than to early-stage announcements. These 
findings are consistent for both positive and negative R&D announcements. Furthermore, the 
study documents a large asymmetry in the stock market’s reaction to positive and negative 
R&D announcements. The mean abnormal return to negative (positive) phase III clinical trials 
is −31.8% (7.5%). In addition, market reactions are explained using project- and firm-specific 
variables. The findings of this study raise two important issues. First, firms may be reluctant 
to disclose negative information because of the huge impact of adverse news announcements. 
Second, given the large information asymmetries in the biotech industry, managers may use 
the value-relevant R&D news announcements as an instrument to time new equity issues 
when information asymmetries (or adverse selection costs) are low. 
 
JEL-classification: G14 
Keywords:   Event study; Market efficiency; Value relevance; Non-financial  
    information; R&D; Biotechnology 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
*
 Contact address: Department of Business Administration, School of Business, Economics and Law at the 
University of Gothenburg. P.O. Box 600, SE-40530 Göteborg. Telephone: +46 31 786 4668. 
hans.jeppsson@handels.gu.se 
 
   
1. Introduction 
At any time, a stock price represents the aggregate expectations of investors on future cash 
flows, with an adjustment for risk. To estimate future cash flows and risk, investors use 
information that they deem to be value relevant (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Barth et al., 
2001). Accounting reflects the financial performance and position of a firm, and as long as the 
firm’s future resembles the past, historical accounting information is associated with stock 
prices. Consequently, many studies have indicated that the book value of equity and net profit 
explains a majority of the cross-sectional variation in stock price (Collins et al., 1997; 
Beisland and Hamberg, 2010). Similarly, analysis of accounting information shows that many 
individual accounting items are value relevant (Amir and Lev, 1996; Hamberg and Beisland, 
2010). 
Clearly, historical accounting information is only value relevant when the future resembles 
the past; this is typically the case in mature industries where it is possible to capitalize 
resources as assets. Problems arise when a firm makes large investments that have to be 
expensed immediately. Because most investments are made in positive NPV projects, an 
immediate expenditure has two consequences. First, current performance measures are 
excessively low (often negative), even though one can expect that the more negative the 
current performance, the more positive future performance will be. Second, the measure of 
the current resources, equity, becomes excessively low because few investments are booked 
as assets. For these firms, accounting information will explain very little of the cross-sectional 
variation in stock price. The future does not resemble the past.  
Instead of relying on accounting information, investors must use voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures of information about the status of the firm’s investment projects. Empirical 
accounting research verifies that voluntary disclosures improve stock liquidity (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1994), reduce the cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997) and increase information 
intermediation (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). However, because voluntary disclosures are 
subject to a self-selection bias, the association between market reactions and disclosure might 
be driven by firm performance rather than by disclosure per se (Healy and Palepu, 2001). In 
this setting, the biotechnology industry is studied as an industry in which investors make little 
use of mandatorily disclosed accounting information and in which voluntary disclosures are 
frequently verified by external regulatory authorities (Guo et al., 2004). These factors enable 
studies of market reactions to the disclosure of information while avoiding the self-selection 
   
biases caused by personal (and often agency cost-based) incentives. Indeed, most of the 
disclosures are obligatory and unbiased. In addition, the non-discretionary nature of 
disclosures in this industry overcomes the common criticism of endogenous events in the 
event study literature (Schultz, 2003; Viswanathan and Wei, 2008).  
This study provides three contributions to the accounting and finance literature. First, it 
documents how the market reacts in aggregate to the disclosure of non-discretionary 
information. It shows the extent to which different information is relevant to investors (in the 
sense that it influences security prices). This knowledge is important to investors who are 
evaluating firms within a given industry. For example, a firm with a single project in phase II 
has a considerably different risk profile than a firm with five projects in clinical trials, of 
which one is in phase II. Although these factors are important to investors, reliable measures 
of these differences are scarce in the literature (particularly for the European biotechnology 
industry). 
Secondly, while numerous studies have used information from the US stock exchanges (Ely et 
al., 2003; McConomy and Xu, 2004), this study used a unique hand-collected dataset of all 
publicly listed firms in the European biotechnology industry from 1998–2009. It has been 
argued that the US biotechnology sector differs from the European biotechnology sector in 
terms of maturity, size and the availability of funding (Dedman et al., 2008). Hence, this study 
provides the largest analysis by far of the European biotechnology industry, covering 87 firms 
from eleven countries over thirteen years. 
Thirdly, the study provides evidence of the differences in market reactions according to 
predictions. In particular, there are differences in stock price and in trading volume between 
projects in different phases, as well as between positive and negative outcomes. The study 
also documented how market reactions are explained, using project- and firm-specific 
variables. 
This study shows that the stock market reacts more strongly to later-stage R&D 
announcements than to earlier-stage R&D announcements. These findings are consistent for 
both positive and negative R&D announcements. Furthermore, this study documents a large 
asymmetry in the stock market’s reaction to positive and negative R&D announcements. The 
mean abnormal return to positive (negative) phase III clinical trials is 7.5% (−31.8%), and this 
result is robust with respect to abnormal trading volume. These findings raise two important 
issues. First, firms may be reluctant to disclose negative information because of the huge 
   
impact of adverse news announcements. Second, given the large information asymmetries in 
the biotech industry, firms may use the R&D news as an instrument to access the capital 
markets when the information asymmetries are low. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review and 
describes the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the methodology, and section 4 explains the 
data sample. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 offers a conclusion. 
 
2. Theory and research hypotheses 
2.1 Value relevance of accounting and non-accounting information 
It is known that value-relevant information changes stock prices because it causes investors to 
revise their expectations of the firms’ future cash flows (Francis and Schipper, 1999). 
Accounting information, such as earnings and book value of equity, has generally been 
considered as value-relevant to investors (Easton and Harris, 1991; Francis and Schipper, 
1999; Beisland and Hamberg, 2010). However, it has been questioned to what extent 
accounting information plays a role for firms in high-tech industries that invest heavily in 
intangible assets, such as R&D, that are less frequently capitalized. Current accounting 
practice requires firms to expense their significant value enhancing investments in internally 
developed intangible assets.
6
 Consequently, assets do not fully reflect a company’s valuable 
resources, and accounting items, such as earnings and book values of equity, are quite 
unrelated to market values (e.g. Amir and Lev, 1996). Historical accounting information is 
only value relevant if the future resembles the past, and it typically does so for firms in mature 
industries where it is possible to capitalize resources as assets. But, for firms in research-
intensive industries accounting information is a poor indicator of firm value. Instead, 
McConomy and Xu (2004) suggest that for biotech firms, non-accounting information, such 
as clinical trials results and governmental approvals, are key drivers of value and better 
indicators of a firm’s future earnings potential.7 
                                                 
6
 According to IAS 38 (IFRS), research costs should be expensed when they incur, while development costs can 
be capitalized if certain criteria are met. One such criteria is that future economic benefits can be  are highly 
probable. 
7
 McConomy and Xu (2004) find that the stock market reacts more strongly to R&D progress information than 
to earnings announcements, indicating that non-financial information is more value-relevant than financial 
information. 
   
In the biotechnology industry, risk and uncertainty associated with R&D projects is especially 
high when compared to other industries (Guo et al., 2004). The high uncertainty is attributable 
to the complexity and novelty of the science, but also to the characteristics of drug 
development, which is a long and expensive process. On average, the costs of developing a 
drug exceed $800 million and it often takes more than 10 years before a drug candidate 
reaches the market (Kaitin, 2003). Drug development has two key features. First, it consists of 
different stages, which are linked to each other and where the movement from one stage to the 
next must be built on the success from the previous stage. Second, regulatory authorities 
closely monitor the drug development process and the movement from one stage to another 
must be approved by these regulatory authorities (such as the EMA in Europe and the FDA in 
the US). 
The high uncertainty in drug development causes most firms to immediately expense R&D 
investments.
8
 In addition, a majority of the firms in the biotech industry (especially in the 
European sector) are at an early stage in the corporate lifecycle. Most of the firms have no 
marketable products that can generate sales revenues; consequently, they report large losses. 
For these firms, the current earnings do not provide a good proxy for future earnings; i.e., the 
future does not resemble the past. 
In summary, the value created from R&D is highly uncertain (Xu et al., 2007). Therefore, it is 
important to consider how investors respond to information that contains a substantial amount 
of uncertainty. 
 
2.2 Corporate disclosures 
Corporate disclosures should reduce the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. Firms may have incentives to make additional voluntary disclosures if they 
perceive that such disclosures will benefit the firm (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), but 
reducing information asymmetry via voluntary disclosures is a trade-off between benefits and 
the costs of disclosing information. Prior empirical research has shown that voluntary 
                                                 
8
 The project stage generally forms the basis for deciding whether the costs associated with development projects 
can be capitalized or not. For example, Amsterdam Molecular Therapeutics do not capitalize their clinical 
development expenditures until filing for market approval or until market approval is obtained, arguing that this 
is basically the first point when it becomes probable that future revenues can be generated (Annual Report, 
2006). Thrombogenics capitalize development costs in clinical phase III, when they estimated that the chance of 
future success is high (Thrombogenics, Annual Report, 2009). 
   
disclosures are associated with a lower cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997), a higher stock 
liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1994), and an increase in the intermediation of 
information (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). In contrast, the costs of disclosures are related to 
benefiting competitors and increasing litigation exposure (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). 
However, because voluntary disclosures are subject to a self-selection bias, the association 
between market reactions and disclosure might be driven by firm performance rather than 
disclosure per se (Healy and Palepu, 2001). In the biotechnology industry, most disclosures 
are mandatory and unbiased.
9
 In addition, managers’ incentives to disclose value-relevant 
product development information are also derived from investor demand (Guo et al, 2004; 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007).Regulatory authorities stipulate the requirements that must be 
met to advance a drug from one development stage to the next, and public firms have to 
disclose information (according to security laws) regarding decisions taken by regulatory 
authorities. These security laws limit the ability of firms to manage and time corporate 
disclosures.
10
 The non-discretionary nature of disclosures in this industry allows for studies of 
the stock market’s reaction to R&D news announcements. In addition, this environment 
overcomes the common criticism of the presence of endogenous events in the event study 
literature (Schultz, 2003; Viswanathan and Wei, 2008). 
Disclosures on particular R&D projects might be value relevant, meaning that they resolve 
investors’ uncertainty about a firm’s ability to generate future revenues from particular R&D 
projects. As an R&D project progresses through the various stages, uncertainty is reduced and 
future expected cash flows become more certain. As a result, the stock market reacts more 
strongly to late-stage announcements (when uncertainty is comparatively low) compared to 
early-stage announcements (when uncertainty is higher). However, prior studies indicate 
inconsistent value relevance between stages during the drug development process.
11
 For 
example, Ely et al. (2003) found that the stock market reacts to status updates related to 
clinical phase II, but not to phase III or to FDA submission announcements.
12
 In contrast, 
McConomy and Xu (2004) and Dedman et al. (2008) proposed that the later stage 
                                                 
9
 For a review of disclosure issues for biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, see Fisher (2002). 
10
 Publicly-listed firms are subject to certain requirements about trading rules and regulations. Following general 
disclosure rules, firms have an obligation to disclose “price sensitive” information as soon as possible to the 
public. 
11
 The stages in drug development are broadly classified as discovery, pre-clinical, clinical phase I, clinical phase 
II, clinical phase III, and regulatory review. 
12
 Ely et al (2003) argue that during phase II, investors begin to ascribe significant value to a drug that is under 
development. 
   
announcements (phase III and the final success) most value-relevant. The first hypothesis is 
the following: 
 
H1: Disclosures of late-stage (phase III) R&D announcements have a more profound effect on 
security pricing than disclosures of early-stage (phase I) R&D announcements. 
 
If clinical trials exhibit negative results in any phase, the firm is required to terminate these 
trials (Xu et al., 2007). As a result, the certainty of a loss following negative results is 
absolutely sure.
13
 In contrast, there is still a great deal of uncertainty remaining after positive 
clinical trial results. Even after a governmental approval, there is uncertainty related to market 
risk. Prior studies on pharmaceutical firms have shown that the stock market’s reaction to 
positive and negative FDA decisions upon new drug approval (NDA) is asymmetrical 
(Sharma and Lacey, 2004; Torabzadeh et al., 1998). One problem is that voluntary disclosures 
of the clinical trial results of pharmaceutical firms suffer from potential self-selection bias, 
meaning that the results cannot be generalized to biotechnology firms.
14
 Prior studies on 
biotech firms have only studied the stock market reaction to positive news, due to small 
sample sizes (Ely et al., 2003; Dedman et al., 2008).
15
 Therefore, the second hypothesis is the 
following: 
 
H2: Disclosures of negative R&D announcements have a more profound effect on security 
pricing than disclosures of positive R&D announcements. 
 
One key feature of the biotechnology industry is that firms disclose detailed information. 
Quite possibly, there is no other industry in which such detailed information about ongoing 
projects is disposed. Corporate disclosures of clinical trial results generally contain such 
                                                 
13
 However, firms can theoretically submit an application to regulatory authorities to start clinical trials on other 
indications. 
14
 Even though the drug development process is essentially identical for biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies, the key difference is that pharmaceutical companies are generally much larger and hold a much more 
diversified project pipeline than biotech companies. Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies have revenue-
generating products, and therefore, failures (and successes) of early-stage projects might be considered to be, 
relatively speaking, less value relevant information. 
   
information as the type of compound, indication, therapy area, stage of development, number 
of patients, comments made by the CEO and/or medical director, et cetera. In addition, 
disclosures describe whether the primary endpoint of the study was met (such as safety, 
efficacy, or tolerability of the drug).
16
 Hence, clinical trial results are subject to a good news-
bad news ranking (Guo et al., 2004). 
 
If the stock market responds differently to similar types of information, the results may be 
driven by key features of the sample. For example, a firm with a single project in phase II has 
a considerably different risk profile than a firm with five projects in clinical trials, of which 
one is phase II. Joos (2003) proposed that collecting a richer data set on the micro level might 
provide additional insight into the value creation process and how R&D contributes to the 
value of a biotech firm. Although it is important to investors, reliable measures of these 
factors are scarce in the literature. Thus, market reactions are explained using project- and 
firm-specific variables. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
This section describes the research methodologies used in the paper. First, the event study 
methodology that was employed to assess the stock market’s reaction to R&D announcements 
is described. Second, the cross-sectional regression model that was used to investigate the link 
between project- and firm-specific variables, as well as stock market returns, is presented. 
 
3.1 Event study 
To investigate the stock market’s reaction to R&D announcements, the standard methodology 
for a short run event study, as suggested by MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997), is 
followed. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted 
returns. The predicted returns are estimated using a single-index market model with an 
                                                                                                                                                        
15
 McConomy and Xu (2004) found that phase III results (positive/negative) exhibits the strongest market 
reaction of the different stages, but do not comment on differences between market reactions between positive 
and negative news across phases. 
16
 Stock exchange regulations not only require information disclosed by the company to be correct, relevant, 
clear, and not misleading, they also requires information to be comprehensive enough to provide adequate 
guidance to render possible assessment of the effect of the price of its securities. 
   
estimation window of 180 days (day −200 to day −21). As a proxy for the market portfolio, 
the equal-weighted dividend- and split-adjusted stock return for all other firms that were 
included in the sample is used.
17
 To eliminate the effect of confounding events and a possible 
dependence between abnormal returns, overlapping events were excluded (using a three-day 
period centered on the announcement date). Day 0 is designated as the day when the firm 
makes the R&D announcement.
18
 If the information is disclosed during a weekend or any 
other time when the markets are closed, the next trading day becomes the event day. As in all 
event studies, there is an implicit assumption that markets are efficient (Fama, 1970).  
As a check of robustness, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for a three-day event 
window (from day −1 to day +1), a five-day event window (from day −2 to day +2), and a 
twelve-day event window (from day −2 to day +10) are calculated. The CAR is calculated by 
aggregating the abnormal returns across two dimensions (firms and time). In addition to 
Student’s t test, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test is used, which does not require 
that the population be normally distributed. 
Trading volumes may provide a better measure of information content than do price reactions 
(Beaver, 1968; Bamber, 1986). While price reactions reflect an average revision in investor 
beliefs, trading volume reactions reflect idiosyncratic belief revisions (Karpoff, 1986; Kim 
and Verrecchia, 1991a and 1991b). Following Ajinkya and Jain (1989), abnormal volume is 
the difference between the actual and predicted trading volume. Equivalent to the estimation 
of predicted returns, the single-index market model with an estimation window of 180 days 
(day −200 to day −21) is used. A firm’s actual volume is the number of shares traded on day t 
scaled to the total number of shares outstanding. The market proxy is the number of shares 
traded for all other firms (that were included in the sample), scaled by these firms’ total 
number of shares outstanding. 
 
                                                 
17
 Biotech- (and pharmaceutical) stocks are non-cyclical. Hence, this study uses an industry index rather than a 
market index. 
18
 Most US studies use the announcement dates in the Wall Street Journal as the event dates. Newspapers 
normally have one or two days of delay in their announcements. Business intelligence databases use newspapers 
as sources of information. Hence, relying on the dates from newspapers or databases might bias the event date. 
Therefore, as a check of robustness, different event windows are used, although the longer event windows tend 
to be noisier.  
   
3.2 Hypothesis testing 
Two tests are performed. First, the stock market’s reaction (with respect to price and volume) 
to early-stage (phase I) and late-stage (phase III) R&D announcements is examined. Second, 
the stock market’s reaction (with respect to price and volume) to positive and negative R&D 
announcements is investigated. To test for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, pair-wise analysis 
of the differences in mean is used. 
 
3.3 Cross-sectional regression 
Following standard practice, a regression model is used to explain the cross-sectional 
variations in abnormal return (Kale et al., 2002), using firm- and project-specific information: 
                                                                     
                  
 
   
    
 
3.2.1 The dependent variable 
The abnormal return on day zero is used as the dependent variable (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). The regression is run for four models with the following dependent variables: (i) all 
R&D announcements (positive and negative), (ii) all positive R&D announcements, (iii) 
positive phase I announcements, and (iv) positive phase II announcements.
19
 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Complexity 
The therapy area of a project is a proxy for the complexity of the research project 
(COMPLEXITY). Projects within therapy areas that tend to have low success rates, such as the 
central nervous system, are expected to have a larger stock market reaction following positive 
news on clinical trials. Historical success rates per therapy area are based on DiMasi (2001).
20
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 The number of R&D announcements in the categories was restricted to test only these models. 
20
 The success rates by DiMasi (2001) are based on pharmaceutical firms and may not directly apply to 
biotechnology firms. However, the success rates are not inflated by the R&D announcements in this sample. 
Hence, they are considered to be independent. 
   
 
Risk-sharing 
Biotech firms generally seek to collaborate with experienced partners in the costly late-stage 
clinical trials to share the risk.
21
 A dummy variable (RISK_SHARING) is given a value of one 
when a project is developed with a partner; otherwise, it is zero. 
 
Investment 
The number of patients varies; not only between the different stages of drug development, but 
also between firms. The size of clinical trials (i.e., the number of patients included in the 
study) is a function of the size of the investment made by the firm and may provide investors 
with a more credible signal of the firms’ belief in the project. The variable (INVESTMENT) is 
the logarithmic value of the number of patients. 
 
Project diversification 
A firm with many projects is less dependent on the success of each single project, compared 
to a firm with only one project. Project diversification (DIVERSIFICATION) is measured as 
the logarithmic market value of equity (measured as the average market value from day −21 
to day −2, relative to the R&D announcement). 
 
Other independent variables 
Other control variables are market-to-book (MTB) and region dummies. Following La Porta et 
al. (1998), region dummies are included to control for the institutional characteristics between 
countries. The Anglo-Saxon region is used as a benchmark relative to the other three regions 
(Germanic, French, and Scandinavian). 
 
 
                                                 
21
 For example, Paion’s business strategy is to partner clinical products after the first major value driving 
milestone (after phase II), in order to share the risk of later clinical development (Paion, Annual Report, 2008). 
   
4. Data and sample selection 
4.1 Sample selection 
This study examines R&D announcements of 87 publicly listed European biotechnology 
firms between 1998 and 2009
22
. The sample is primarily identified from the Thomson 
Datastream database. Three restrictions to the sample are made. First, the company’s primary 
quotation has to be at a European stock exchange. Second, only firms that are engaged in the 
development of drugs are included.
23
 Third, to ensure a homogenous sample, pharmaceutical 
and generic companies are excluded. These restrictions reduce the number of firms from 431 
to 87. These firms are listed on the following stock exchanges: Vienna Stock Exchange 
(Austria), Copenhagen Stock Exchange (Denmark), Helsinki Stock Exchange (Finland), 
Euronext Paris (France), Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Germany), Milano Stock Exchange 
(Italy), Euronext Amsterdam (the Netherlands), Oslo Stock Exchange (Norway), OMX 
Stockholm (Sweden), Swiss Stock Exchange (Switzerland), and London Stock 
Exchange/Alternative Investment Market (United Kingdom).  
Financial and accounting information such as the dividend- and split-adjusted stock prices and 
trading volumes, as well as the number of shares outstanding and the book value of equity, are 
gathered from the Thomson Datastream. 
 
4.2 R&D announcements 
This study uses a complete sample of 1,089 R&D announcements made by all public 
biotechnology firms between 1998 and 2009.
24
 The information related to R&D 
announcements is hand-collected from corporate websites.
25,26
 
                                                 
22
 Ely et al. (2003) use a sample of 83 US biotech firms with no marketable products between 1988 and 1998. 
Dedman et al. (2008) use a sample of 22 UK firms, comprising a mixture of both biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies. The final sample consists of 151 positive announcements made between 1990 and 
1998, of which 81 are made by three pharmaceutical firms. 
23
 The biotechnology companies can be broadly classified to the fields of medical devices, diagnostics, 
information technology, tools and equipment, and drug development. 
24
 Hence, survivorship bias is not considered as a problem. 
25
 For some inactive firms, the announcement dates are collected using annual reports and the Factiva database. 
26
 Joos (2003) argue that clinical trial results may also become available through alternative information sources, 
such as medical journals, conference abstracts and analyst meetings, and consequently, some news may suffer 
from potential biases. However, stock exchange regulations require public firms to have their own website on 
which ”price-sensitive” information shall be made available as soon as possible after the information has been 
disclosed. According to these rules, firms are not allowed to provide price sensitive information at general 
meetings or analyst presentations without also disclosing the information elsewhere. 
   
Clinical trial results are subject to a good news-bad news ranking (Guo et al., 2004). Stock 
exchange regulations not only require the information disclosed by a company to be correct, 
relevant, clear, and not misleading, they also require the information to be comprehensive 
enough to provide adequate guidance to assess the effect on the price of its securities. Firms 
must have a headline indicating the substance of the announcement and they must also clearly 
present the most important information at the beginning of the announcement. Hence, 
wording in the heading such as “positive results,” “successful completion” or “primary 
endpoint was met” are classified as positive news. Similarly, press releases including adverse 
notifications such as “negative results,” “failure” or “primary endpoint was not met” are 
coded as negative news. Examples of a positive and a negative R&D news announcement are 
given in Appendix 1. Description and classification of R&D announcements is illustrated in 
Table 1. The event date, stage of development, and firm- and project-specific information are 
also collected from the press releases.  
 
Table 1. Description and classification of R&D announcements 
Announcement category Stage Number of announcements 
Initiation 
Pre-clinical 
8 
Results (positive) 56 
Results (negative) 15 
Initiation 
Phase I 
200 
Results (positive) 123 
Results (negative) 36 
Initiation 
Phase II 
214 
Results (positive) 175 
Results (negative) 55 
Initiation 
Phase III 
88 
Results (positive) 66 
Results (negative) 35 
Total  1,071 
Note: This table reports different types of announcements related to different phases (or stages) of the R&D 
process. These announcements are classified to three main announcement categories: initiation, results (positive), 
and, results (negative). Four different phases are distinguished between, i.e. pre-clinical, phase I, phase II and 
phase III. The review stage is excluded due to few observations. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the distribution of positive and negative R&D announcements per stage. In 
total, there are 1,071 news announcements, of which 561 announcements are related to 
positive and negative R&D results. There are more positive R&D announcements than 
negative R&D announcements: 75% [420/(420+141)] of the R&D announcements are 
   
positive. These findings are consistent with those of Dedman et al. (2008) and Ely et al. 
(2003), who also found that firms disclose relatively few negative announcements in relation 
to positive announcements. The cumulative success rate from pre-clinical to clinical phase III 
is 30%, which reflects the low success of drug development.
27,28
 Interestingly, the main 
attrition occurs in late-stage, rather than in early-stage, as 35% of the projects fail in phase III, 
and only 23% fail in phase I.
29
 The results contrast those in DiMasi (2001), where the main 
attrition of pharmaceutical companies occurred in phases I and II (87%). There are also more 
announcements of phase II than of phase I because firms often expand a candidate drug’s 
number of indications during later clinical stages. Fewer announcements concern the initiation 
of projects at the pre-clinical stage, compared with the initiation of projects in the clinical 
stages.  
Preclinical results are often published in scientific journals and companies only sporadically 
disclose this information in annual reports and company announcements (Joos, 2003). A firm 
has no reason to file an Investigational New Drug (IND) with regulatory authorities if they 
find that the drug has adverse effects in animal studies. As a result, an announcement related 
to this stage may suffer from a self-reporting bias problem. In summary, this study primarily 
focuses on the three stages of drug development: clinical phase I, phase II and phase III, and 
there is good reason to believe that disclosures during these stages constitute the most value 
relevant disclosures about the firms’ projects. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Stock market reaction to R&D announcements 
Table 2 presents the short-run stock price and volume reaction to R&D announcements 
related to the stages of drug development. The stock market reacts positively (negatively) to 
all positive (negative) R&D announcements on day zero.
30,31
 The day zero mean abnormal 
return is 1.99% (−12.25%) for clinical phase I results, 6.37% (−15.78%) for clinical phase II 
                                                 
27
 The success rate is the probability that a project entering a phase reaches the next phase. Attrition, or failure, is 
equal to one minus the success rate. 
28
 Not tabulated. [15/(56+15)]* [36/(123+36)]* [55/(175+55)]* [35/(66+35)] = 0.303 
29
 [35/(66+35)] 
30
 All of the reactions are statistically significant at the 1% level, but reactions to positive phase I announcements 
were significant at the 5% level. 
   
results and 7.53% (−31.77%) for clinical phase III results. The strong stock market reaction to 
negative news announcements, especially to clinical phase III, suggests that they were largely 
unanticipated by investors. In the most extreme case, the market value decreased by 75% 
during one day on a single negative phase III news announcement (not tabulated). 
 
Table 2. Mean abnormal returns (      ), mean cumulative abnormal return (         ), mean 
abnormal volume (      ), and, cumulative abnormal volume (         ) for R&D 
announcements 
 
  Abnormal return (%)  Abnormal volume (%) 
Stage of 
R&D process 
Event 
n 
        
(t value) 
              
(t value) 
 
n 
        
(t value) 
              
(t value) 
Phase I Initiation 200 1.55*** 
(3.07) 
1.22* 
(1.77) 
 190 0.30 
(1.47) 
0.37 
(1.28) 
 Results (positive) 120 1.99*** 
(3.67) 
1.68** 
(2.32) 
 
 118 0.54*** 
(2.81) 
0.73*** 
(2.62) 
 
 Results (negative) 34 -12.25*** 
(-3.94) 
-15.20*** 
(-5.04) 
 32 3.00* 
(1.93) 
3.52* 
(-1.91) 
Phase II Initiation 202 1.23** 
(2.46) 
0.95* 
(1.71) 
 180 0.23*** 
(3.16) 
0.30** 
(1.99) 
 Results (positive) 174 6.37*** 
(4.21) 
 
 
7.13*** 
(4.43) 
 172 0.93*** 
(4.96) 
1.66*** 
(4.90) 
 Results (negative) 55 -15.78*** 
(-4.24) 
-24.18*** 
(-4.25) 
 54 2.58** 
(2.01) 
4.94*** 
(2.67) 
Phase III Initiation 88 2.28 
(1.31) 
2.57 
(1.53) 
 78 0.26 
(1.22) 
0.29 
(0.85) 
 Results (positive) 66 7.53*** 
(8.02) 
6.44*** 
(4.45) 
 65 0.90** 
(2.55) 
1.23*** 
(2.83) 
 Results (negative) 34 -31.77*** 
(-4.45) 
-38.80*** 
(-5.35) 
 32 7.82*** 
(2.59) 
11.55*** 
(3.13) 
Note: This table reports mean abnormal return and mean abnormal volume for day zero and for the event 
window (-1 to +1 day relative to the announcement day). Mean cumulative abnormal return is estimated as: 
                         
  
    
.         
 
 
     
 
   .      is calculated using estimates from the market model: 
                     . Mean cumulative abnormal volume is estimated as:                          
  
    
. 
        
 
 
     
 
   .      is calculated using estimates from the market model:                      . The t 
values are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
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 Non-parametric tests confirm the results. 
   
Column two of Table 2 documents the stock market’s reaction over a three-day event window 
(days −1 to +1 relative to the announcement day). Positive R&D announcements are no 
different when using a one- or three-day event window. In contrast, negative R&D 
announcements exhibit a larger negative reaction when using the three-day event window. For 
example, the three-day cumulative abnormal return to negative phase II results is −24.18% (t-
statistic −4.25), while the day zero mean abnormal return is −15.78% (t-statistic −4.24). If 
negative announcements are largely unanticipated, one would expect that the larger stock 
market reaction to negative news for the three-day event window occurs on day zero and on 
the following day, rather than before the event date.
32
 Not tabulated data shows that the mean 
cumulative abnormal return prior to the event (i.e., day −10 to day −1) is −8.31% for negative 
phase I news announcements (t-statistic −3.02). However, the market’s reactions to negative 
phase II and phase III news announcements are insignificant; hence, investors do not seem to 
anticipate negative phase II and III results. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 present the results of the day zero mean abnormal volume and the 
three-day mean cumulative abnormal volume for R&D announcements, respectively. The 
stock market reacts to all positive (negative) R&D announcements on day zero. For example, 
the mean abnormal volume on day zero for negative phase III results is 7.82% (t-statistic 
2.59) compared to 3.00% (t-statistic 1.93) for negative phase I results. The mean cumulative 
abnormal volume over the three-day window documents that the trading volume increases 
significantly for negative phase II and III results, compared to day zero (11.55% > 7.82%, and 
4.94% > 2.58%, respectively). In contrast, the trading volumes (in regards to the positive and 
negative phase I results) only exhibit small differences between the one- and three-day event 
windows. 
Table 2 also reports that the stock market reacts positively to news about the initiations of 
clinical phase I (1.55%, t-statistic 3.07) and clinical phase II (1.23%, t-statistic 2.46), but that 
there is no significant reaction to initiations of clinical phase III. There are two explanations 
for this result for clinical phase III. First, phase initiations are not always good news because 
firms may start a clinical trial for fewer indications than were being investigated in the prior 
stage (Joos, 2003). Second, following positive clinical phase II results, the initiation of 
clinical phase III trials is generally already assumed by investors. 
                                                 
32
 It is important to note that only events with no announcements that occurred simultaneously or during a three-
day period centered on the event date are included in the sample, and, hence, the impact of other events should 
not explain the difference between the day-zero and the three-day event window. 
   
To test for hypotheses 1 and 2, pair-wise analysis of differences in mean between early-stage 
(phase I) and late-stage (phase III) announcements are analyzed. The results are shown in 
Table 3. Panel A of Table 3 presents the pair-wise analyses of the differences in mean 
abnormal return for early-stage and late-stage R&D announcements, as well as for positive 
and negative R&D announcements. The difference between early-stage positive R&D 
announcements and late-stage positive R&D announcements is 5.54% and significant at the 
1% level (t-statistic 5.14). Similarly, the difference between early-stage negative R&D 
announcements and late-stage negative R&D announcements is 19.52% (t-statistic 2.51). 
Hence, the pair-wise analysis supports H1 for both positive and negative R&D 
announcements. 
 
Table 3. Hypothesis testing 
 
Panel A. Abnormal return (%) 
 
 
Positive 
R&D news 
Negative R&D 
news 
Difference 
Early-stage 
1.99*** 
(3.67) 
12.25*** 
(3.94) 
10.26*** 
(4.52) 
Late-stage 
7.53*** 
(8.02) 
31.77*** 
(4.45) 
24.24*** 
(5.46) 
Difference 
5.54*** 
(5.14) 
19.52** 
(2.51) 
 
Notes: This table reports pair-wise analysis of differences in mean abnormal return for early-stage and late-stage 
R&D announcements, and, for positive and negative R&D announcements. Negative R&D news are reported in 
absolute values. Reported t-values are the results of the Games-Howell pair-wise comparison test with unequal 
variances. ***, **, and *, denote one-tail 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
Panel B. Abnormal volume (%) 
 
 
Positive 
R&D news 
Negative R&D 
news 
Difference 
Early-stage 
0.54*** 
(2.81) 
3.00* 
(1.93) 
2.46 
(1.57) 
Late-stage 
0.90** 
(2.55) 
7.82*** 
(2.59) 
6.92** 
(2.19) 
Difference 
0.46 
(0.87) 
4.82 
(1.38) 
 
Notes: This table reports pair-wise analysis of differences in mean abnormal volume (%) for early-stage and late-
stage R&D announcements, and, for positive and negative R&D announcements. Reported t-values are the 
results of the Games-Howell pair-wise comparison test with unequal variances. ***, **, and *, denote one-tail 
1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
   
Next, negative and positive R&D announcements and their impact on mean abnormal returns 
are compared. The results show that there is a statistically significant difference between 
positive and negative news both for early-stage (t-statistic 4.52) and late-stage (t-statistic 
5.46) R&D announcements; these results support H2. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents a pair-wise analysis of the differences in the mean abnormal 
volume for early-stage and late-stage R&D announcements, as well as for positive and 
negative R&D announcements. While a significant stock market reaction with respect to 
trading volume is observed on day zero, there is only a significant difference between positive 
and negative late-stage R&D announcements (6.92%, t-statistic 2.19). Thus, the volume tests 
offer no support for H1. 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
5.3.1 Event windows 
Table 4 presents the mean cumulative abnormal return (volume) for R&D announcements for 
two different event windows: days −2 to +2, and days −2 to +10, respectively. Overall, the 
results reveal that the price- and volume-reactions to phase II and phase III results are 
persistent over longer event windows, while only price-reactions to negative phase I results 
are persistent. 
 
  
   
Table 4. Mean cumulative abnormal return (         ) and mean cumulative abnormal 
volume (         ) for R&D announcements 
 
  Abnormal return  Abnormal volume 
Stage of 
R&D process 
Event 
n 
              
(t value) 
               
(t value) 
 
n 
              
(t value) 
               
(t value) 
Phase I Initiation 200 1.47* 
(1.93) 
1.34 
(1.15) 
 190 0.43 
(1.26) 
0.40 
(0.65) 
 Results (positive) 120 1.33* 
(1.71) 
-1.28 
(-0.93) 
 118 0.75** 
(2.42) 
0.75 
(1.37) 
 Results (negative) 34 -17.25*** 
(-5.82) 
-19.31*** 
(-3.91) 
 32 3.58* 
(1.84) 
2.73 
(1.31) 
Phase II Initiation 202 0.45 
(0.64) 
-0.41 
(-0.31) 
 180 0.38* 
(1.70) 
0.69 
(1.19) 
 Results (positive) 174 7.33*** 
(4.17) 
6.43*** 
(2.86) 
 172 2.08*** 
(4.55) 
3.18*** 
(4.04) 
 Results (negative) 55 -24.74*** 
(-4.49) 
 
-27.78*** 
(-3.88) 
 54 6.33*** 
(3.08) 
 
9.12*** 
(3.49) 
Phase III Initiation 88 1.84 
(0.95) 
4.62 
(1.46) 
 78 0.25 
(0.64) 
-0.20 
(-0.28) 
 Results (positive) 66 5.34*** 
(2.94) 
6.69* 
(1.68) 
 65 1.53*** 
(2.69) 
2.48*** 
(3.58) 
 Results (negative) 34 -38.60*** 
(-5.73) 
-38.55*** 
(-5.16) 
 32 13.32*** 
(2.91) 
14.63** 
(2.55) 
Note: This table reports mean abnormal return and mean abnormal volume for two different event windows (-2 
to +2 day, and -2 to +10 day relative to the announcement day, respectively). Mean cumulative abnormal return 
is estimated as:                          
  
    
.         
 
 
     
 
   .      is calculated using estimates from the market 
model:                      . Mean cumulative abnormal volume is estimated as:                  
        
  
    
.         
 
 
     
 
   .      is calculated using estimates from the market model:          
            . The t values are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
5.3.2 Cross-sectional regression results 
To examine the association between the magnitude of the abnormal returns on day zero and 
the project- and firm-specific variables, a cross-sectional regression model is used. Panel A of 
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the independent variables. The mean success rate 
(COMPLEXITY) per therapy area is 0.56. The average clinical trial (INVESTMENT) enrolls 
176 patients (or health volunteers). 24.5% of the projects are developed in collaboration with 
   
a partner (RISK_SHARING). However, there is a large variation in the size. The largest 
clinical trial involves 3,000 patients and the smallest has only 10 patients enrolled (not 
tabulated). The average market capitalization (DIVERSIFICATION) is €369 million. Most of 
the firms are quite small, though a few firms are substantially larger than the average (not 
tabulated). Panel B of Table 5 contains a pair-wide correlation matrix and documents a low 
correlation overall between the independent variables. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 St. dev 
COMPLEXITY 483 0.555 0.446 0.512 0.646 0.122 
RISK_SHARING 483 0.245     
INVESTMENT 483 176.1 33 66 186 318.9 
DIVERSIFICATION 483 369.2 87.0 155.0 312.0 713.0 
MTB 483 2.145 0.697 1.047 2.017 3.153 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the independent variables. COMPLEXITY, RISK_SHARING, 
and, INVESTMENT are project-specific variables. DIVERSIFICATION and MTB are firm-specific variables. 
COMPLEXITY is the historical success rate per therapy area. RISK_SHARING equals 1 if the project is 
developed in collaboration with a partner company, zero otherwise. INVESTMENT represents size of the 
clinical trial, i.e. the number of patients. DIVERSIFICATION is measured as the average market value of equity 
20 days prior to the R&D news announcement (measured between day -24 to day -5). MTB represents market-
to-book value of equity and is measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
preceding the R&D announcement (scaled by the median market-to-book value). 
 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
 COMPLEXITY RISK_SHARING INVESTMENT DIVERSIFICATION MTB 
COMPLEXITY 1     
RISK_SHARING 0.117* 1    
INVESTMENT -0.066 0.160** 1   
DIVERSIFICATION -0.028 -0.026 0.071 1  
MTB 0.167 -0.038 0.075 0.310*** 1 
Notes: This table reports pair-wise correlations. ***, **, and *, denote two-tail 1%, 5% and 10% significance, 
respectively. The variables are detailed in Table 5, panel A. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the cross-sectional regression model. The dependent variables 
are the day zero abnormal returns for (i) all positive R&D announcements, (ii) positive phase 
I announcements, and (iii) positive phase II announcements. In general, these tests confirm 
our expectations. Model (i) documents negative and significant effects of COMPLEXITY (t-
   
statistic −2.00) and DIVERSIFICATION (t-statistic −2.21), as well as a positive and 
significant effect of INVESTMENT (t-statistic 1.99). In model (ii) and model (iii), positive 
R&D announcements of phase I and II are tested separately. Both models suggest that 
COMPLEXITY, INVESTMENT and DIVERSIFICATION are statistically significant.  
 
Table 6. Cross-sectional regression model 
 
                                                                                       
 
   
    
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
  
All positive R&D 
announcements 
(n=360) 
Positive phase I 
announcements 
(n=120) 
Positive phase II 
announcements 
(n=174) 
INTERCEPT  
0.191*** 
(2.69) 
0.186 
(1.40) 
0.216 
(1.20) 
     
COMPLEXITY - 
-0.158** 
(-2.00) 
-0.264* 
(-1.68) 
-0.150* 
(-1.66) 
     
RISK_SHARING - 
0.031 
(0.92) 
0.013 
(0.81) 
0.089 
(0.89) 
     
INVESTMENT + 
0.039** 
(1.99) 
0.055* 
(1.80) 
0.047* 
(1.69) 
     
DIVERSIFICATION - 
-0.050** 
(-2.21) 
-0.025* 
(-1.82) 
-0.089** 
(-2.45) 
     
MTB +/- 
0.002 
(0.41) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
0.021 
(1.18) 
     
Dummies for regions +/- Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table provides the estimates from the linear regressions. The sample consists of R&D 
announcements made by publicly listed European biotech firms during 1998-2009. The dependent variable is the 
day zero abnormal return for (i) all positive announcements, (ii) positive phase I announcements, and, (iii) 
positive phase II announcements. COMPLEXITY, RISK_SHARING, and, INVESTMENT are project-specific 
variables. DIVERSIFICATION and MTB are firm-specific variables. COMPLEXITY is the historical success 
rate per therapy area. RISK_SHARING equals 1 if the project is developed in collaboration with a partner 
company, zero otherwise. INVESTMENT represents size of the clinical trial and is measured as the log of 
number of patients recruited to the study. DIVERSIFICATION is measured as the log of average market value 
of equity 20 days prior to the R&D news announcement (measured between day -24 to day -5). MTB represents 
market-to-book value of equity and is measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity preceding the R&D announcement (scaled by the median market-to-book value). All regressions contain 
robust standard errors. 
 
In summary, three project-specific variables can explain the cross-sectional variation in 
positive R&D news: (1) when there is low probability of a success but a success occurs, the 
market reaction is large (COMPLEXITY); (2) the smaller and less diversified the firm is, the 
larger the market reaction (DIVERSIFICATION); and (3) the more capital that has been 
invested in the clinical trial, the larger the market reaction (INVESTMENT). The models do 
not lend support to the idea that RISK_SHARING could explain the cross-sectional variation 
in abnormal returns.  
   
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the stock market’s reaction to disclosures of non-accounting 
information in the biotechnology industry. Interest in the value relevance of non-accounting 
information comes from the concern that accounting information is not particularly relevant in 
certain industries in which firms invest heavily in intangibles such as R&D. The 
biotechnology industry has two features that make studies of market reactions to the 
disclosure of non-accounting information of special interest. First, disclosures are generally 
mandatory (rather than voluntary), and hence, self-selection biases caused by personal 
incentives are less prominent. Second, the drug development process is heavily regulated and 
monitored by regulatory authorities. As a result, the non-discretionary nature of disclosures in 
this industry overcomes the common criticism of endogenous event in the event study 
literature. 
The empirical study is based on a unique hand-collected dataset of all publicly-listed firms in 
the European biotech industry from 1998–2009. While prior studies have used data from the 
US stock exchanges, this study provides the largest analysis by far of the European biotech 
industry, covering 87 firms from 11 countries over 13 years. The study shows the extent to 
which different non-accounting information, such as positive and negative news 
announcements concerning R&D projects, are value relevant to investors and can influence 
security prices and trading volumes. The study provides evidence of differences in market 
reactions according to predictions. In particular, there are differences in stock price and 
trading volume differences between projects in different phases, as well as between positive 
and negative outcomes. 
The findings highlight two important issues. First, the large stock market reaction to clinical 
trial events is of great concern to both investors and the management of biotech companies. 
Firm managers may be reluctant to disclose negative R&D news; this reluctance highlights 
the importance of stock exchange regulations and the disclosure of price-sensitive 
information. At the same time, the disclosure of information has to be credible and reliable to 
investors and other market participants. This is of crucial importance in an industry where 
capital markets provide the only funding alternative. Second, the firm’s managers may use the 
value-relevant R&D news as an instrument to access the capital markets when information 
asymmetries are low.  
   
While the biotechnology industry has certain characteristics, the identification of value-
relevant non-accounting information could be assessed in other high-tech industries. 
  
   
Appendix 1.  
Example of a negative R&D news announcement: 
Topline results of phase III study in acute ischemic stroke (DIAS-2) do not demonstrate difference 
between Desmoteplase and placebo  
“Aachen (Germany), May 31st, 2007 – PAION AG (Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Prime Standard: PA8) and its 
US partner Forest Laboratories, Inc. (NYSE: FRX) today announced topline results of the DIAS-2 
(Desmoteplase In Acute Ischemic Stroke) study with the compound Desmoteplase. The Phase III study was 
designed to investigate the improvement of clinical outcome in patients with acute ischemic stroke treated with 
Desmoteplase within 3 to 9 hours after onset of stroke symptoms as compared to placebo. The primary efficacy 
endpoint (difference between active treatment and placebo in percentage of composite responders as defined 
below) was not met. The blinded, randomized, placebo-controlled, dose-ranging trial was jointly conducted by 
PAION and Forest Laboratories, Inc., and enrolled a total of 186 patients in Europe, USA, Canada, Australia, 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Forest Laboratories, Inc., is the partner of PAION for Desmoteplase for North 
America and H. Lundbeck A/S for the rest of the world.”33 
 
Example of a positive R&D news announcement: 
Ablynx reports positive phase I results for its anti-thrombotic nanobody®, ALX-0081  
“GHENT, Belgium, 17 December 2007 - Ablynx [Euronext Brussels: ABLX], a pioneer in the discovery and 
development of Nanobodies®, a novel class of antibody-derived therapeutic proteins, today reported the final, 
positive results from a Phase I study of its lead development programme, ALX-0081. The results of the double-
blind, placebo controlled study in 40 healthy male volunteers show that ALX-0081, an anti-thrombotic 
therapeutic, was safe and well tolerated at all doses tested, with no dose limiting toxicities or serious adverse 
events.  
ALX-0081, generated through Ablynx’s in-house discovery platform, is a novel “first-in-class” therapeutic 
Nanobody® targeting von Willebrand Factor (anti-vWF). It is being developed to reduce the risk of thrombosis 
in patients with acute coronary syndrome (ACS) and thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura (TTP). Following 
these positive Phase I results, Ablynx will now progress ALX-0081 to a multi-dose study in 2008.  
In the study, treatment with the Nanobody® did not result in detectable immunogenicity. The study suggests that 
ALX-0081 adopts at least the plasma half-life of the target, von Willebrand Factor. The expected anti-thrombotic 
activity was shown with a biomarker in all volunteers receiving at least 2 mg of ALX-0081, indicating the high 
potency of the drug. ALX-0081’s pharmacological activity, based on a single injection, started at the lowest dose 
of 2 mg and reached a maximum duration of 12 hours at a dose of 12 mg.  
                                                 
33
 http://www.paion.de/en/newsroom-2007 
   
Edwin Moses, CEO and Chairman said: “We are extremely pleased with these positive safety results and 
demonstration of the high potential potency of ALX-0081, our first Nanobody® in clinical development. In 
addition, ALX-0081 has been progressed from discovery to completion of Phase I in just over three years, 
demonstrating the speed at which our discovery platform can generate a novel therapeutic. Based on these 
positive data, we are looking forward to initiating our discussions with the regulatory authorities this year and 
embarking on our next clinical study in 2008 in order to progress programmes in acute coronary syndrome and 
TTP.”34
                                                 
34
 http://www.ablynx.com/newsroom/pressreleases_2007.php 
  
Appendix 2. Mean abnormal return (      ) for R&D announcements 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
 Initiation Results (positive)  Results (negative)  Initiation Results (positive) Results (negative) Initiation Results (positive)  Results (negative)  
 (n=200) (n=120) (n=34) (n=202) (n=174) (n=55) (n=88) (n=66) (n=34) 
Day        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value 
-10 -0.47** -2.05 0.03 0.08 -0.53 -0.54 0.34 0.95 0.11 0.33 1.12 1.43 0.15 0.49 -0.20 -0.31 -0.38 -0.52 
-9 -0.03 -0.12 0.37 1.02 0.11 0.15 -0.50 -1.58 0.22 0.61 0.06 0.11 -0.18 -0.44 -5.15 -1.11 -0.14 -0.27 
-8 -0.18 -0.79 -0.08 -0.21 -0.93 -0.60 0.35 0.77 0.00 0.01 -0.38 -1.06 0.52 1.28 -0.82 -0.88 0.34 0.43 
-7 -0.19 -0.79 0.44 1.07 -2.97 -1.33 0.73 1.16 0.57** 1.92 1.78 0.86 0.34 0.62 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.21 
-6 -0.20 -0.69 -0.17 -0.53 0.14 0.15 -0.49 -1.25 -0.29 -0.70 2.62 0.93 0.26 0.60 2.12 0.93 0.22 0.21 
-5 -0.16 -0.69 0.36 1.17 -2.26*** -2.90 -0.14 -0.45 -0.25 -1.05 1.38 1.08 0.10 0.22 -0.44 -0.62 1.87** 1.98 
-4 0.13 0.43 -0.47 -1.19 0.99 1.62 0.24 0.92 -0.06 -0.20 0.70 0.74 -0.26 -0.59 -0.66 -0.12 1.05 1.26 
-3 0.36 1.20 -0.34 -0.92 -1.04 -1.46 0.02 0.07 1.01 1.50 -0.56 -1.35 -0.30 -0.65 -0.47 -0.19 -0.34 -0.46 
-2 0.38 1.29 -0.28 -0.92 -0.42 -0.71 -0.35 -1.15 0.05 0.17 0.25 0.51 -0.36 -0.80 -0.83 -1.24 -0.68 -0.80 
-1 -0.10 -0.35 -0.30 -0.91 -1.40* -1.82 -0.21 -0.56 -0.03 -0.08 0.81 0.64 0.24 0.75 -0.05 -0.06 0.41 0.77 
0 1.55*** 3.07 1.99*** 3.67 -12.25*** -3.94 1.23** 2.46 6.37*** 4.21 -15.78*** -4.24 2.28 1.31 7.53*** 8.02 -31.77*** -4.45 
1 -0.24 -0.84 -0.02 -0.03 -1.55** -2.27 -0.08 -0.27 0.78 1.52 -9.21** -2.56 0.05 0.07 -1.04 -1.29 -7.43 -1.54 
2 -0.13 -0.53 -0.07 -0.25 -1.63* -1.79 -0.15 -0.51 0.16 0.42 -0.81 -0.90 -0.37 -0.65 -0.27 -0.46 0.88 0.42 
3 0.07 0.32 -0.59** -2.11 0.21 0.32 0.02 0.09 -0.41 -1.07 -2.34*** -3.27 0.64 0.75 0.22 0.17 -1.99 -1.35 
4 -0.30 -1.09 -0.31 -1.07 -0.29 -0.37 -0.89 -1.34 -0.18 -0.47 -0.32 -0.51 0.24 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.39 
5 0.42 1.17 -0.12 -0.40 0.37 0.34 -0.31 -1.25 -0.07 -0.15 -0.18 -0.35 0.16 0.41 0.80 0.50 -0.63 -1.22 
6 0.11 0.45 -0.48 -1.16 -0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.69 -0.36 -1.45 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.20 -1.89 -1.46 2.48** 2.00 
7 -0.15 -0.52 0.12 0.38 -1.58 -1.39 0.38 1.45 0.20 0.51 2.33** 2.32 0.63 1.07 1.53 0.96 -1.19 -1.21 
8 -0.04 -0.17 -0.55* -1.90 -1.24 -0.91 -0.03 -0.11 -0.31 -0.95 -1.11 -0.71 0.29 0.36 -1.56 -1.17 0.68 0.81 
9 -0.11 -0.48 -0.45 -1.37 0.01 0.02 -0.15 -0.53 0.18 0.53 0.25 0.18 1.73** 2.15 2.07 1.33 -0.25 -0.28 
10 -0.13 -0.60 -0.21 -0.62 0.45 0.60 -0.11 -0.47 0.06 0.21 -1.68** -2.41 -0.84*** -3.07 0.18 0.13 -0.60 -0.63 
Note: Mean abnormal return is estimated as:         
 
 
     
 
   .      is calculated using estimates from the market model:                      . ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
   
Appendix 3. Mean abnormal volume (      ) for R&D announcements 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
 Initiation Results (positive)  Results (negative)  Initiation Results (positive) Results (negative) Initiation Results (positive)  Results (negative)  
 (n=190) (n=118) (n=32) (n=180) (n=172) (n=54) (n=78) (n=65) (n=32) 
Day        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value        (%) t-value 
-10 -0.10* -1.83 0.00 -0.01 -0.28** -2.33 -0.08 -1.48 0.06 1.13 0.04 0.39 -0.07 -1.58 0.02 0.32 -0.18 -0.60 
-9 -0.10*** -2.95 0.04 0.64 -0.13** -1.97 -0.08** -2.01 0.06 0.71 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.16 -0.02 -0.63 1.06 0.70 
-8 -0.10*** -2.73 0.00 0.09 -0.13 -1.37 -0.09** -2.46 0.06 0.92 0.05 0.52 -0.02 -0.41 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.14 
-7 -0.15*** -3.25 -0.04 -1.61 0.81 1.04 -0.12*** -2.77 0.12 1.07 0.23 1.03 -0.03 -0.32 -0.01 -0.34 0.81 0.76 
-6 -0.02 -0.24 -0.06* -1.78 0.16 0.67 -0.02 -0.55 0.12 0.88 0.31 1.42 -0.05 -0.59 0.06 1.18 0.00 -0.03 
-5 -0.09** -2.43 -0.06* -1.66 0.01 0.14 -0.04 -0.75 0.07 1.17 0.29 0.83 -0.07 -1.31 0.00 0.05 -0.20 -0.52 
-4 -0.07 -1.21 -0.05* -1.72 -0.20*** -2.91 -0.04 -0.62 0.09* 1.79 0.19 0.97 -0.10* -1.73 0.33 1.18 -0.28 -0.84 
-3 0.03 0.78 0.00 0.10 -0.23*** -3.01 -0.07 -1.34 0.25* 1.94 0.12 1.37 -0.07 -1.34 0.45 1.45 0.18 0.50 
-2 0.02 0.41 0.01 0.08 -0.11 -1.23 0.02 0.22 0.17 1.74 -0.01 -0.14 -0.05 -0.57 0.14** 2.31 0.47 1.10 
-1 -0.01 -0.18 0.00 -0.09 -0.13 -1.47 0.01 0.16 0.12 1.71 0.02 0.18 -0.07 -1.18 0.04 0.83 0.09 0.56 
0 0.30 1.47 0.54*** 2.81 3.00* 1.93 0.23*** 3.16 0.93*** 4.96 2.58** 2.01 0.26 1.22 0.90** 2.55 7.82*** 2.59 
1 0.08 0.92 0.19 2.02 0.65* 1.87 0.06 0.83 0.61*** 4.48 2.34*** 2.93 0.09 0.75 0.29*** 3.33 6.47** 2.18 
2 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.38 0.17 1.10 0.06 0.99 0.25*** 3.07 1.40** 2.19 0.02 0.20 0.09 1.41 3.47 1.64 
3 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.40 -0.18 -1.29 -0.04 -0.82 0.17** 2.05 0.51*** 2.69 -0.04 -0.54 0.03 1.01 1.18 1.63 
4 -0.01 -0.15 0.10 0.75 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.20 0.10** 2.07 0.48** 2.53 0.00 0.00 0.08* 1.80 0.81 1.58 
5 0.08 1.08 -0.06* -1.80 -0.13 -1.17 -0.05 -1.23 0.34** 2.27 0.34** 2.48 0.05 0.50 0.09 1.44 0.48 1.02 
6 0.03 0.42 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.57 0.08 0.75 0.16** 2.17 0.39** 1.96 -0.09 -1.39 0.17* 1.79 0.80 1.03 
7 -0.06 -1.29 -0.01 -0.15 -0.15 -1.53 0.09 0.96 0.11* 1.83 0.35* 1.94 -0.05 -0.98 0.12 1.22 -0.03 -0.07 
8 0.05 0.53 0.07 0.73 -0.04 -0.22 0.10 0.80 0.08 1.47 0.29* 1.71 0.00 -0.02 0.20 1.52 2.76 1.03 
9 -0.09** -2.38 -0.03 -0.98 -0.18* -1.81 0.03 0.40 0.05 0.92 0.23* 1.65 -0.14** -2.32 0.06 1.22 1.03 0.92 
10 -0.02 -0.40 -0.05* -1.95 -0.09 -1.05 0.10 0.75 0.08 1.45 0.20 1.50 -0.18*** -2.75 0.10* 1.77 0.16 0.72 
Note: Mean abnormal volume is estimated as:         
 
 
     
 
   .      is calculated using estimates from the market model:                      . ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Abstract 
Market timing is a much-discussed topic in the capital structure literature. We study two 
views of equity market timing, mispricing and adverse selection costs, using a sample of 232 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) made by publicly listed European biotech firms between 
1998 and 2010. To a large extent, equity is issued to sustain operations, and the average 
survival time at the announcement date is less than 12 months. There is, however, support for 
both the mispricing and the adverse selection cost hypotheses. Biotech stocks perform 
significantly better in the months preceding the announcement of an equity issue. However, 
there is no sign that the issuing biotech firm yields an abnormal return in the same time 
period. Univariate analyses suggest that adverse selection costs influence the issue of new 
equity, as both positive and negative news announcements are associated with equity 
announcements. It seems as though the mispricing and adverse selection cost hypotheses have 
incremental effects. In particular, negative news announcements are followed by issues of 
new equity even though negative news carries no obvious investment need (and survival time 
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Growing enterprises usually require external capital to fund their operations. Accessing 
capital markets is a balancing act that depends on both firm- and market-specific factors. 
Somewhat surprisingly, academic research is still puzzled by management’s decisions over 
when and why to seek external equity financing. Over the years, two main theories have 
emerged: the mispricing and the adverse selection cost theories. According to the mispricing 
theory, managers seek external capital when it can easily get capital at favorable prices 
(Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). For the same reason, 
they will also repurchase shares when prices are excessively low (Ikenberry et al., 1995). The 
mispricing theory suggests that managers believe the firm is not always correctly priced and 
that managers, for their own sake, want to capitalize on the mispricing. In contrast, the 
adverse selection cost theory is built on a dynamic framework of the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
model, where time-varying asymmetric information plays a major role. The rationale goes 
that firms issue equity when adverse selection costs are low, that is, following credible 
information releases (Korajczyk et al., 1991). Consequently, the adverse selection cost theory 
suggests there are moments when it is more favorable for managers to issue equity without 
necessarily acting solely in their own interest. 
Past empirical research has verified the importance of both theories; however, discriminating 
between them is cumbersome. For example, the adverse selection cost theory suggests that 
new equity is issued following the disclosure of credible information. However, an issue of 
new equity might be made after information has been disclosed because management believes 
that the firm’s prospects are mispriced. In particular, information is usually discretionary, and 
both voluntary and mandatory disclosures can be manipulated by management. Observing 
equity issues following the release of accounting information (Korajczyk et al., 1991) is thus 
unlikely to be a clean test of the adverse selection cost hypothesis. 
With these issues in mind, we study an industry, biotechnology, that has some attractive 
characteristics. Typically, biotech firms are in an early life-cycle stage with no commercial 
products and, hence, their investments cannot be internally funded. Because investments are 
mainly in (unrecognizable) intangible assets they cannot use debt financing either, and instead 
they regularly turn to the equity market. Therefore, a sample of biotech firms enables a study 
of equity market timing without having to think about alternative sources of external capital. 
Because biotech firms are in the early life-cycle stage, accounting information is a poor 
indicator of how research projects create value (Dedman et al., 2008; McConomy and Xu, 
2004). However, indirectly, regulatory authorities, such as the European Medicinal Authority 
  
(EMA) and the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), make independent assessments of the 
research projects. These assessments are known to be value relevant (Jeppsson, 2010) and 
cannot be manipulated by the biotech firm. Few industries are characterized by having so 
many value-relevant and non-discretionary disclosures as the biotech industry. 
In this setting, we study market timing and assess the mispricing and adverse selection cost 
arguments. To avoid having the measure of mispricing affected by asymmetric information 
(between the biotech firm’s management and shareholders) and manipulated information, we 
measure mispricing as the pre-issue stock return of other biotech firms. Firms are expected to 
issue new equity when market sentiments are strong, in other words, following general 
increases in stock prices. The adverse selection cost hypothesis is also tested using non-
discretionary information, namely, regulatory authorities’ assessment of the biotech firm’s 
research projects. We expect firms to issue new equity when there is comparatively more 
information about their ability to create value. 
The primary motive for seeking external financing is a need to sustain operations. Therefore, 
we expect market timing (either because of mispricing or adverse selection costs) to be 
incremental to the biotech firm’s survival time.35 The sample consists of 87 European biotech 
firms that have been publicly listed sometime between 1998 and 2010. In total, these firms 
have made 232 equity offerings as well as 561 public announcements concerning the 
development of their research projects. 
The empirical data confirms that new equity, to a large extent, is issued to sustain operations; 
the average survival time at the announcement date is 12 months. However, in addition to the 
survival time, there is support for both the mispricing and the adverse selection cost 
hypotheses. Biotech stocks perform significantly better in the months before firms issue new 
equity, and they continue to do so in the months thereafter. There is, however, no sign that the 
issuing biotech firm yields an abnormal return in these time periods. Univariate analyses 
suggest that adverse selection costs influence the issue of new equity, as both positive and 
negative news announcements are associated with equity announcements. A comparison 
between mispricing and adverse selection cost shows that they, to some extent, have 
incremental effects. Negative news announcements are, surprisingly, followed by issues of 
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million, the Company is able to determine the timing of the fund raising and its announcement when it deems the conditions 
most appropriate”. 
  
new equity, even though negative news carries no obvious investment need (and survival time 
is controlled for). We see this as clear support for the adverse selection cost hypothesis.  
The remainder of the paper is outlined in the following way. Section two provides a 
theoretical framework, an overview of prior studies and a presentation of the two research 
hypotheses. Section three discusses methodological issues related to the study. Section four 
contains the empirical results and, finally, section five concludes. 
 
2. Theory and research hypotheses 
2.1 Market timing and capital structure 
The capital structure decision has puzzled finance researchers for decades (Lintner, 1965; 
Myers, 1984), and two capital structure theories dominate research: the “static trade-off” and 
the “pecking-order” models. In the static trade-off model, firms have a target capital structure, 
determined by advantages and disadvantages of debt financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977). Although agency costs are important in this setting, the capital structure 
decision depends on a rational analysis of relevant factors, and there is little room for 
managerial opportunism or for the timing of capital markets. 
In the pecking-order model, firms follow a financing hierarchy, in which they finance their 
investments first with internal funds, then with external debt, and finally with equity as a last 
resort (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). This model considers that agents make the 
decision, and that information is asymmetrically distributed between the firm’s management 
and shareholders. In a similar vein, it has been suggested that a firm’s capital structure is an 
effect of management’s ability to seek external financing when accessible at a low cost (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). Two views on equity market timing have emerged: the mispricing and 
the adverse selection cost hypotheses. 
 
2.2 The mispricing hypothesis 
The standard finance model, in which rational investors make stock prices equal the present 
value of expected future cash flows, has considerable problems explaining many stock market 
events (Shiller, 2000; Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Empirical research has come across several 
factors, such as size and the book-to-market ratio, which seems to be associated with stock 
  
returns without necessarily being measures of systematic risk. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that corporate finance decisions (e.g., initial public offerings, mergers, acquisitions and issues 
of equity and debt) are non-random. Just like investors, managers make use of capital markets 
as if they are predictable. The seemingly systematic variations in the association between 
stock price and fundamentals form the basis for the mispricing hypothesis of equity issuance. 
There are many reasons for taking a privately owned firm public, including investment needs 
and public attention. However, a most important reason is that owners of the private firm 
believe they get a good price. Initial public offerings (IPOs) occur in cycles (Ibbotson and 
Jaffe, 1975; Ritter, 1984; Ibbotson et al., 1988, 1994) that seem to follow stock market 
sentiments; when prices are high, there are more IPOs (Pástor and Veronesi, 2005). In a 
similar vein, Alti, (2006) shows that market sentiments increase not only the number of IPOs 
but also their size and the proportion of the firm that is sold. 
Research on mergers and acquisitions also reveal patterns, usually referred to as merger 
waves (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Harford, 2005; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). While 
merger waves are more complicated to pinpoint – as dependent on prices of both acquiring 
and target firms and the method of payment – they stem from the idea of predictable stock 
prices. Harford (2005) explain merger waves as the outcome of market timing, where 
industries respond to shocks and reorganize through mergers and acquisitions, creating a 
clustering of merger activity, in which liquidity plays an important role. 
A clustering of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in “hot issue” markets is well known in the 
finance literature (Hickman, 1953; Choe et al., 1993; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996). Starting 
with Taggart (1977), many studies also show how firms make more SEOs when market 
valuations are high relative to book values or historical market values. Survey evidence in 
Graham and Harvey (2001) reveals that market timing is a primary concern of corporate 
executives: CFOs admit that timing considerations influence financing decisions. In a very 
important study, Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that the capital structure is, by and large, 
a product of capital market timing. Several empirical studies have examined the stock market 
performance of firms conducting equity issues. For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) find 
that firms issuing stock, either through IPOs or SEOs, experience low returns in subsequent 
years. In summary, there is ample evidence that firms take advantage of temporary mispricing 
in financial markets and thus issue equity when it is perceived as being be overvalued.  
  
The market mispricing hypothesis suggests that managers issue new shares when market 
prices are high (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995), and repurchase shares when market 
prices are low (Ikenberry et al., 1995). There are two possible reasons for this behavior. One 
such reason is that managers have access to insider information and thus know better than 
investors what the firm’s true performance is. Essentially, managers make use of 
asymmetrically distributed information. The second reason is that equity markets, in general, 
are “hot”, in the sense that investors for the moment seem to be more optimistic about 
expected growth rates, profit margins, etc. This second reason is based on market sentiments, 
rather than asymmetric information, and it suggests that the firm’s operating performance is 
unassociated with the decision to issue new equity (Alti, 2006). While the asymmetric 
information argument is interesting in itself, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Firms issue new equity to a larger extent when equity market sentiments are strong. 
 
2.3 The adverse selection cost hypothesis 
Information asymmetries decrease when new value-relevant information is made public. 
Given that the disclosure of value relevant information varies between firms and over time, 
the level of asymmetrically distributed information also varies (Dierkens, 1991; Lucas and 
McDonald, 1990; Choe et al., 1993). Immediately following relevant news announcements, 
asymmetries are low, but the information advantage of management increases with time. 
Korajczyk et al. (1991, 1992) suggest that the perceived change in information asymmetry 
raise investments’ adverse selection costs. There is thus a rational expectation that corporate 
financial decisions, such as issues of new equity, are influenced by information asymmetry 
and the release of new credible information. We refer to this as the adverse selection cost 
hypothesis of equity issuance, which suggests that firms issue equity when the market is 
comparatively better informed.  
Empirical research tends to use mandated accounting information as a measure of credible 
value-relevant information. Korajzcyk et al. (1991; 1992) find that firms issue more equity 
following the disclosure of financial reports, when the asymmetry of information is small. In 
addition, the price drop at the announcement of a new equity issue increases with the time 
since credible information has been disclosed. All in all, they suggest that adverse selection 
  
costs influence equity issuances negatively and that mandatorily reported accounting 
information reduces these costs. 
Investors react to different types of information in the equity issuance setting. Korajczyk et al. 
(1991) find that accounting earnings have a significant effect on the market’s reaction to the 
issuance of new equity. This is supported by Denis and Sarin (2001) who find earnings 
announcements from four quarters prior to the offer significantly associated with the market’s 
reaction. Therefore, equity issues tend to follow informative earnings releases. Information of 
a more discretionary character seems less informative. Loderer and Mauer (1992) find that 
dividend announcements do not reduce valuation uncertainty. Lin et al. (2008) get similar 
price reactions, although dividends appear to be associated with volume reactions. Most non-
accounting disclosures are discretionary and firms tend to make more such disclosures prior 
to issues of new equity (Cooper and Grinder, 1996; Lang and Lundholm, 2000). In summary, 
the association between disclosure and issuances of new equity supports the adverse selection 
cost hypothesis, and the association improves with the disclosed information’s credibility. 
Healy and Palepu (1990) document that firms perform better than usual when they issue new 
equity; however, after the issue, their profitability decreases (Loughran and Ritter, 1997). 
Quite the same, IPO firms are more profitable than similar firms already listed (Pagano et al., 
1998) and more profitable than they are subsequent to the public listing (Jain and Kini, 1994; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997). The excess performance around the time of the issue of new equity 
can be a function of equity market timing, but a number of studies suggest that information 
disclosures are used opportunistically around the time of the SEO (Rangan, 1998; 
Shivakumar, 2000), and the IPO (Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; Roosenboom et al., 
2003). Although accounting information is informative and reduces adverse selection costs 
surrounding issuances of equity, it is still manipulable. Other type of announcements, such as 
information about major investments, product launches, and collaborations, are even more 
discretionary. When tests of the adverse selection cost hypothesis are based on discretionary 
information, it is impossible to avoid biases from manipulated information and thus 
mispricing issues. 
Studying firms in the biotechnology sector is particularly interesting given the problems 
highlighted above. Biotech firms are in early life-cycle stages, and, with their future 
performance being considerably uncertain, the adverse selection cost problems are likely to be 
substantial. Because biotech firms tend to be unprofitable and are unable to capitalize their 
  
investments as assets, accounting information is less value relevant (Dedman et al., 2008; 
McConomy and Xu, 2004). However, regulatory authorities have to assess biotech firms’ 
investment projects whenever they are in critical stages; therefore, there are credible non-
discretionary evaluations of the value-creation process. Disclosure of how clinical trials 
progress is known to impact share prices and volumes (Jeppsson, 2010). On the basis of the 
above-mentioned discussion, we expect the following: 
 
H2: Firms issue new equity to a larger extent after they have released disclosures of R&D. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
The study is based on firms operating in the biotechnology industry, as it offers unique 
opportunities to study the decision to issue new equity. Biotech firms invest heavily on a 
continuous basis, but they can rarely fund these investments internally. Consequently, they 
regularly turn to the equity market for new capital. 
Two issues make the biotech setting interesting. First, investors are unable to use accounting 
information in any meaningful way when assessing the biotech firm’s future prospects. If a 
loss is indicative of future performance, then the firm has no value (Hayn, 1995; Beisland and 
Hamberg, 2010). In this case, investments are expensed immediately and, hence, both the 
income statement and the balance sheet contain little information useful to forecast future 
cash flows. Investors are, therefore, fully dependent on other type of information. 
Second, biotech firms differ from other research-intensive firms in the sense that the 
development process is closely monitored by regulatory authorities with considerable 
experience of how to evaluate drugs on issues such as efficacy and safety. The biotech firm 
usually cooperates with regulatory authorities in early phases of research as a failure to 
comply with recommendations might ultimately prolong the development process, inhibit a 
future drug approval, and even lead to private lawsuits and enforcement actions by agencies 
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Although accounting information has a low association to the value of biotech firms (Dedman 
et al., 2008; McConomy and Xu, 2004), investors can rely on information that is verified by 
  
regulatory authorities acting independently. A candidate drug’s progress in clinical trials is a 
strong signal to investors that the firm creates value (e.g., Jeppsson, 2010). 
 
3.2 Measures 
Our main interest is in identifying factors that affect the decision to make an equity offer. In 
this section we discuss the dependent (i.e., the equity announcement) and independent 
variables. 
 
The equity announcement 
Because biotech firms invest substantial amounts in research projects and tend to have few 
projects with positive operating cash flows, they need to issue new equity on a regular basis. 
From an economic perspective, the main motive for issuing new equity is that projects with a 
positive net present value exist and need to be funded. Therefore, when future investment 
cash flows cannot be covered by existing funds, the firm seeks external funding to sustain its 
survival.
36
 A negative aspect of issuing new equity is that pre-issue shareholders have to split 
the value of future cash flows with others. Pre-issue shareholders lose rights to future cash 
flows unless they subscribe for their part of the new issue.  
If a new issue of equity is used to finance previously unconsidered operating activities, the 
market’s reactions to the new issue of equity might be positive. However, if the capital is used 
to finance ongoing activities, there will be a price drop following the announcement of a new 
issue. Although we make no distinction between different forms of equity issuances in the 
empirical study, we acknowledge that there are some notable differences between them. An 
important aspect of how to design a seasoned equity offering (SEO) is the uncertainty of the 
equity issue situation. A public offer typically offers the most uncertainty, whereas a rights 
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 There might be other options available for the biotech firm. One option is to cancel, or delay, investments. A 
considerable portion of the biotech firm’s resources consist of human capital, and while a temporary reduction of 
personnel expenses reduces overall costs, it is in reality difficult not to make it a permanent reduction. From a 
strategic point of view, it might be undesirable and an absolute last resort. Another option is to sell valuable 
resources, should there be any, to another biotech firm. This alternative has two drawbacks; resources are often 
difficult to disentangle, and, if so, they often carry a lower value when disentangled. In addition, the choice to 
sell assets only exists if there is excess cash in the biotech industry and this tends to be positively correlated with 
market sentiments. In other words, it might be just as difficult to sell assets as it is to issue new equity. A final 
option is to enter a partnership with another firm on a candidate drug and thereby achieve an upfront cash 
payment. 
  
offer (directed towards all shareholders or a few shareholders) removes some of the 
uncertainty. Another way to reduce uncertainty is to have an underwriter in the form of a large 
pre-issue shareholder or financial intermediaries. 
We do not study the point in time when the subscription period starts or when the firm 
receives the proceeds of the equity. Instead, a dummy variable (ISSUE) takes the value 1 
when the firm-quarter contains a public news announcement with details on a coming issue of 
new equity; otherwise, it takes the value 0. We use corporate websites, annual reports and the 
Thomson Reuters Knowledge Database to identify equity announcement dates. 
 
Survival time 
Financial distress has a well-known effect on capital structure decisions (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1966), and analyses of the decision to issue equity often employ the level of debt 
as a proxy of it (e.g., Mackie-Mason, 1990). Biotech firms tend not to hold debt, but given 
that their cash flows are almost always negative (large continuous investments and little 
revenue) costs associated with financial distress are captured using the firm’s expected 
“survival time”; the time that the firm can sustain its operations without seeking additional 
financing or cutting back on its research activities (Lerner et al., 2003). 
Following Lerner et al. (2003) survival time (SURVIVAL_TIME) is measured for each quarter 
as the firm’s beginning-of-period cash balance scaled by net income. Net income is used as a 
proxy for cash flows because biotech firms tend to expense most investments immediately 
and, in addition, these firms rarely gain revenue from continuous operations. In the regression 
models, we use the inverse of the firms’ survival time. There is no association between 
positive earnings and survival time (i.e., when earnings are positive, the survival time is 
infinite); therefore, the measure is set to zero for profitable firms (Lerner et al., 2003). In 
summary, because shorter survival time increases the probability of encountering financial 
distress costs, we expect the probability of issuing new equity to decrease with survival time. 
 
Mispricing 
We expect a biotech firm to hasten the issue of new equity should its management perceive 
that the equity market is overpriced. Biotech firms expense most of their investments 
  
immediately, the market-to-book ratio to be likely to be a biased measure of overpricing.
37
 
Instead, we use historic stock returns as indicators of positive market sentiments and 
mispricing (Taggart, 1977; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; DeAngelo et al., 2010). The bulk of the 
analysis is made on quarterly data; consequently, for each firm in the sample, we use the 
following measures: 
Absolute firm stock return: the dividend- and split-adjusted stock return in the 120 trading 
days (approximately 6 months) before and after the middle of each quarter. 
Index stock return: the equal-weighted dividend- and split-adjusted stock return of all other 
biotech firms (included in the sample) in the 120 trading days before and after the middle of 
each quarter. 
Abnormal stock return: the difference between the absolute and index stock returns. We 
assume unsystematic risk is similar across the industry (DeAngelo et al., 2010). 
For firms that issue new equity, we use the same measurement procedure for the 120 trading 
days before and after the equity issue announcement date. To avoid effects stemming from 
asymmetric and, possibly, manipulated information, we use the index stock return 
(PRE_INDEX_RET and POST_INDEX_RET) in regression analyses. If management decides 
to take advantage of a perceived mispricing at the industry level it does so without using 
private information. It is quite likely that the absolute stock return is positively correlated with 
the index stock return. For robustness reasons, we also include the abnormal stock return in 
some of the analyses (PRE_FIRM_RET and POST_FIRM_RET). 
In the empirical analysis, we test for differences in index (and abnormal) stock returns 
between equity announcement dates and those firm-quarters when there is no announcement 
of an issue of new equity. We expect PRE_INDEX_RET to be positively associated with the 
decision to issue new equity. We do not have any a priori expectation concerning 
POST_INDEX_RET, as it depends on the length of and the announcement time in a “hot 
issue” period. We do not have any expectations concerning the association between the 
decision to issue new equity and PRE_FIRM_RET and POST_FIRM_RET. 
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 Indeed, all measures involving accounting information are likely to suffer from biases. 
  
Adverse selection costs 
We expect the issue of new equity to be positively associated with announcements of the 
progress of the biotech firm’s candidate drugs in clinical trial. Credible announcements of the 
status of research projects reduce adverse selection costs, and, as a result, managers make use 
of investors’ better understanding of the firm’s prospects and issue equity shortly after public 
news announcements about their R&D projects. We measure the number of news 
announcements made in the 90 days
38
 before (/after) the middle of each quarter. For 
robustness reasons, we complement equal-weighted measures with phase-weight measures. It 
is not possible, a priori, to determine whether one is better than the other; rather, we prefer 
the simplicity of equal-weighted measures. We also distinguish between positive and negative 
news announcements. Both provide information to investors that reduces adverse selection 
costs, but their propensity to do so, as well as their association to other variables might differ. 
Equal-weight positive outcome announcements: the sum of announcements with a positive 
outcome, in which research phases are equally weighted. 
Equal-weight negative outcome announcements: the sum of announcements with a negative 
outcome, in which research phases are equally weighted. 
Phase-weight positive outcome announcements: the sum of announcements with a positive 
outcome, in which research phases are phase weighted (i.e., phase I equals 1, phase II equals 2 
and phase III equals 3). 
Phase-weight negative outcome announcements: the sum of announcements with a negative 
outcome, in which research phases are phase weighted (i.e., phase I equals 1, phase II equals 2 
and phase III equals 3). 
For firms that issue new equity, we use the same measurement procedure for the 90 days 
before and after the equity issue announcement date. Equally weighted positive and negative 
outcome announcements (R&D_NEWS_POS and R&D_NEWS_NEG) are used in the 
regression analyses, where we test for differences in the equally weighted positive and 
negative outcome announcements between equity announcement dates and those firm-
quarters when there is no announcement of an issue of new equity. According to the adverse 
                                                 
38
 Because regulatory authorities meet irregularly, their decisions (i.e., the biotech firms’ news announcements) 
are clustered over time. As clustering mainly occurs within quarters and not between them, using 90 days 
removes a bias that otherwise would come should equity issues also be clustered over time (if, for example, 
quarterly reports are used to mitigate adverse selection costs). 
  
selection cost hypothesis it is expected that both R&D_NEWS_POS and R&D_NEWS_NEG 
are positively associated with the decision to issue new equity. Because the announcement of 
positive news often implies that new investments need to be made, we assume that 
R&D_NEWS_NEG is a somewhat stronger confirmation of the hypothesis. 
 
Control variables 
To ensure that results are not driven by omitted correlated variables, we include a number of 
control variables: intangible intensity (INT_INT), investor understanding (AGE), firm size 
(SIZE), and growth opportunities (MKTBOOK). In addition, we also control for differences in 
market efficiency and institutional setting by employing region dummies. These variables are 
briefly discussed underneath. 
As of January 2005, all firms in our sample apply International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). In our study, the most important accounting standard is IAS 38, which deals with 
intangible assets including investments in R&D. IAS 38 states that no intangible asset arising 
from research shall be recognized (IAS 38: 54), and it defines criteria that have to be met if 
development expenditure are to be recognized. These criteria include technical feasibility and 
the ability to prove that future economic benefits are probable. In most cases these criteria 
inhibit biotech firms from capitalizing their investment, and if they do capitalize, the 
capitalized investment is likely to represent only a small portion of total investments. In other 
words, they are expensed immediately. Prior to 2005, firms in our sample employed local 
accounting standards, which vary substantially on many accounts. To control for variations in 
the capitalization of intangibles, we measure the level of intangible intensity in the form of 
total intangible assets scaled by total assets (INT_INT). 
Most shareholders are outsiders and rely on public information alone. They have to rely on 
information given to them by management and on insider owners acting in the interest of all 
shareholders. The extent to which the biotech firm has been publicly listed and thus upholds a 
track record is likely to be an indicator of how well investors know the firm. We measure this 
as the number of months that the firm has been publicly listed (AGE). A firm’s size (SIZE) 
and market-to-book ratio (MKTBOOK) are used to control for several concerns, including risk 
and growth opportunities. Often, a larger firm is less dependent on individual news 
  
announcements; therefore, SIZE also reduces scaling problems associated with news 
announcements. 
Market efficiency and the level of shareholder protection are known to vary across 
institutional settings. To mitigate this problem, we use dummies for the four regions specified 
by La Porta et al. (1998); Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, French and Scandinavian legal origins. 
We use the Anglo-Saxon legal system as the reference. 
 
3.3 Research model and data 
We use a probit regression model and differentiate, on a quarterly basis, between firms that 
have issued an announcement declaring that they issue new equity and all other firms (our 
tests are thus based on all firm-quarters in the sample). We expect both mispricing 
(PRE_INDEX_RET and POST_INDEX_RET) and adverse selection costs (R&D_NEWS_POS 
and R&D_NEWS_NEG) to have incremental effects beyond those of survival time 
(SURVIVAL_TIME) and other control variables. 
 
ISSUE(0,1) = SURVIVAL_TIME + PRE_INDEX_RET + POST_INDEX_RET + 
R&D_NEWS_POS + R&D_NEWS_NEG + CONTROLS. 
 
 
Equity issue data 
The total sample (issuers and non-issuers) consists of 87 European biotech firms that have 
been publicly listed some time during 1998 and 2010.
39
 For firms that are cross-listed, we use 
share price information from the stock market in the country in which the firm is domiciled. 
In total, these firms make 232 seasoned equity offerings
40
 (SEOs). Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics of the SEOs. In Panel A, SEOs are sorted by year and by region 
following La Porta et al. (1998). 
                                                 
39 The studied firms are listed in 14 countries across Europe. 
40 Firms can issue new shares (i.e., primary shares), or they can sell existing shares held by insiders or stockholders (i.e., 
secondary shares). We only consider SEOs in which the firm received cash because only the issuance of primary shares leads 
to a capital inflow to the firm, which can be used to finance investments. Similarly, we do not include SEOs, in which a firm 
has made standby equity distribution agreements (SEDA) or committed equity financing facility (CEFF).  We exclude IPOs 
because we have no historical stock market data. The sample firms primary raise funds to finance existing and new drug 
development projects. Some firms also mention that they raise capital to broaden the institutional ownership base and to 
provide the firm with a better position when negotiating new collaboration agreements.  
 
  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) across regions 
 English  German  French  Scandinavia  Total 
 Firms Issues Value  Firms Issues Value  Firms Issues Value  Firms Issues Value  Firms Issues Value 
1998 12 6 48.3  2 0 0  2 0 0  6 2 78.7  22 8 127.0 
1999 13 5 37.5  4 0 0  3 0 0  6 1 3.7  26 6 41.1 
2000 15 11 431.1  8 0 0  4 1 63.1  11 2 61.3  38 14 555.5 
2001 15 2 62.1  9 1 34.2  4 0 0  12 3 31.2  40 6 127.6 
2002 15 2 56.1  10 0 0  4 0 0  12 2 23.2  41 4 79.2 
2003 16 7 130.0  11 2 33.7  4 1 4.0  12 4 66.5  43 14 234.2 
2004 20 3 41.1  11 5 150.7  4 3 57.9  12 5 149.7  47 16 399.5 
2005 24 8 266.7  17 5 107.7  7 4 110.6  15 8 217.7  63 25 702.7 
2006 25 14 246.4  20 9 220.0  11 7 216.9  17 8 271.8  73 38 955.1 
2007 24 6 112.8  21 11 496.0  16 4 277.1  18 8 567.7  79 29 1453.6 
2008 24 7 116.3  20 5 86.9  17 0 0  18 5 51.4  79 17 254.6 
2009 20 12 181.7  21 8 126.8  17 7 495.0  18 12 392.0  76 39 1195.5 
2010 20 3 38.1  21 5 70.4  17 3 214.0  18 5 87.9  76 16 410.3 
Total  86 1768.2   51 1326.4   30 1438.7   65 2002.6   232 6536.0 
Note: All values displayed in the table are denominated in million Euros. Regions by origin follow the classification by La Porta et al (1998).
 In total, the 232 SEOs raised equity capital worth €6.536 billion. Firms of Scandinavian 
origin have raised the most equity capital, totaling €2.00 billion in 65 equity issues (i.e., 
€30.81 million per issue). Firms of English origin have made the largest number of equity 
issues, 86, with a total value of €1.77 billion (i.e., €20.56 million per issue). The largest 
amount per issue has been made by biotech firms of French origin: €47.96 million per issue. 
These differences could be an indication of systematic variations between the different 
regions.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel B. Issue size per year 
Issue size (MEUR) 
Year Sum 
Listed 
firms 
n 
Sum / 
firms 
n / 
firms 
Sum / n 
Mean 
Median Min Max St. dev. 
1998 127.0 22 8 5.8 0.364 15.9 10.7 0.4 46.7 15.7 
1999 41.1 26 6 1.6 0.231 6.9 6.1 2.8 14.5 4.2 
2000 555.5 38 14 14.6 0.368 39.7 17.4 0.5 251.1 63.7 
2001 127.6 40 6 3.2 0.150 21.3 14.0 3.1 57.2 20.9 
2002 79.2 41 4 1.9 0.096 19.8 16.3 8.0 38.6 13.2 
2003 234.2 43 14 5.4 0.326 16.7 17.1 1.0 31.8 9.9 
2004 399.5 47 16 8.5 0.340 25.0 17.8 6.0 87.2 20.8 
2005 702.7 63 25 11.2 0.397 28.1 17.4 2.2 84.9 21.7 
2006 955.1 73 38 13.1 0.521 25.1 17.2 1.1 98.5 22.4 
2007 1453.6 79 29 18.4 0.367 50.1 32.1 2.5 272.8 62.3 
2008 254.6 79 17 3.2 0.215 15.0 12.2 1.0 54.1 13.2 
2009 1195.5 76 39 15.7 0.513 30.7 16.9 0.2 301.8 53.0 
2010 410.3 76 16 5.4 0.211 25.6 13.4 1.2 152.0 37.6 
 6536.0 87 232 75.1 2.667 28.2     
Notes:All values displayed in the table are denominated in million Euros.  
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the number and size of equity issues per 
year. The number of European biotech firms has increased substantially over time, as has the 
number of new equity issues. There is, however, a substantial variation over time, both in 
terms of the number of issuing firms and the size of their equity issues. Whereas the average 
size of gross issue proceeds has been €28.2 million, the lowest annual average is €6.9 million 
(1999), and the highest is €50.1 million (2007). Interestingly, the number of firms making an 
issue of new equity does not dip/peak in the same years; 1999 is quite an average year, and in 
the years 2006 and 2009, more than half of the biotech firms issue new equity (in 2007, 37% 
of the firms issue new equity). Finally, the value of the equity proceeds also varies 
substantially and is determined by both the number of issuing firms and the value of their 
 issues. As a consequence, the sum of the proceeds per firm is €18.4 million in 2007, €3.2 
million in 2008, only to be followed by €15.7 million in 2009. 
 
R&D announcements 
The study is based on 87 firms that issued new equity in the years 1998 to 2010. In total, 
these firms have made 561 public announcements on clinical trial results. These 
announcements are classified on a good news-bad news ranking as suggested by Guo et al. 
(2004). The details of this classification are discussed in Jeppsson (2010). There are some 
discretionary elements in the disclosure of news announcements concerning, in particular, 
research projects in their early stages. Before initiation, regulatory authorities approve the 
design of a study, including primary and secondary endpoints, but they often do not scrutinize 
the clinical results before the biotech firm initiates the next phase. Opportunistic 
interpretations of results would, however, lead to serious discontent from both investors and 
regulatory authorities. Table 2 reports the distribution of positive and negative R&D 
announcements related to different stages. There are more news announcements concerning 
phase II projects than there are concerning phase I projects (and more news announcements 
concerning phase I projects than pre-clinical projects), and the main reason is that advancing 
a study often means that the biotech firm has to design multiple studies with different 
endpoints (e.g., separate safety and efficacy studies). Positive news announcements are more 
common than negative news announcements. Failure rates are the highest, at 35%, for phase 
III projects [35 / (66+35)], but the overall failure rate is 70%.
41
 
Table 2. Description and classification of R&D announcements 
Announcement category Phase Number of announcements 
Results (positive) 
Pre-clinical 
56 
Results (negative) 15 
Results (positive) 
Phase I 
123 
Results (negative) 36 
Results (positive) 
Phase II 
175 
Results (negative) 55 
Results (positive) 
Phase III 
66 
Results (negative) 35 
Total  561 
Note: This table reports different types of announcements related to different phases (or stages) of the R&D 
process. 
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 Not tabulated. [15/(56+15)]* [36/(123+36)]* [55/(175+55)]* [35/(66+35)] = 0.303 
 4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Market timing of new equity issues 
Mean-comparison test of the mispricing hypothesis 
The mispricing version of equity market timing is tested using two measures of mispricing. 
The primary measure is mispricing at the market level (measured in the form of 
PRE_INDEX_RET), and the other is based on mispricing at the firm level (measured in the 
form of PRE_FIRM_RET). The first measure considers all other biotech firms included in our 
sample prior to/ after the issue of new equity. We expect firms to issue new equity when there 
are positive market sentiments, and the market-wide measure is a stronger indication of 
timing than the firm-specific measure. Table 3 tabulates a mean-comparison analysis of 
market sentiments around the issue of equity. The means for the 206 issuers and 1,642 non-
issuers are reported separately and t-statistics for differences across these groups are 
presented.
42
 
Issuers of equity have a higher absolute stock return prior to an equity issue than non-issuing 
firms. This is consistent with Lucas and McDonald (1990) and Guo and Mech (2000), who 
show that firms tend to issue equity following large stock price run-ups. The t-statistics of the 
abnormal stock return indicate that there is no difference in means between issuers and non-
issuers prior to an equity issue (p > 0.10). However, consistent with expectations, the t-
statistics of the equal-weight index return show that firms issue equity following a stock price 
run-up of all other biotech firms in the sample (p < 0.000). We also observe that the post 
index return (POST_INDEX_RET) is positive and significant (p < 0.000), indicating that the 
timing of new equity issues occurs in the middle of a financing window.  
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 The reason for showing less than 232 issues of new equity in Table 3 is that some issues were made less than 
120 trading days after the firm’s public listing. Therefore, the abnormal stock return cannot be calculated. For 
the same reason, in the multiple regressions in Table 6, there are slightly fewer observations in those quarters 
when PRE_FIRM_RET is used as an explanatory variable. These differences in sample size have no material 
effects on the empirical results. To have a representative sample, we use samples that are as large as possible. 
 Table 3. Market sentiments around the issue of equity 
  6 months before issue 6 months after issue 
 Number Mean Difference Mean Difference 
Absolute firm stock return 
Issuers of equity 206 -0.0413 0.0896** -0.0458 0.0591 
Non-issuers of equity 1642 -0.1309 (0.028) -0.1049 (0.149) 
      
Equal-weight index return 
Issuers of equity 206 -0.0898 0.1090*** -0.0179 0.0899*** 
Non-issuers of equity 1642 -0.1988 (0.000) -0.1077 (0.000) 
      
Abnormal stock return 
Issuers of equity 206 0.0485 -0.0195 -0.0279 -0.0308 
Non-issuers of equity 1642 0.0680 (0.556) 0.0028 (0.414) 
Notes: This table reports mean-comparison test results of market sentiments before and after the issue of equity. 
We use three measures (a) absolute firm stock return, (b) equal-weight index return, and, (c) abnormal stock 
return. We measure the stock returns in three ways (a) as the dividend- and split-adjusted stock return of the 
firm in the 120 trading days prior to/ after the issue of new equity (b) as the dividend- and split-adjusted stock 
return of all other biotech firms (included in our sample) in the 120 trading days prior to/ after the issue of new 
equity (c) as the difference between the dividend- and split-adjusted stock return of the firm in the 120 trading 
days prior to/ after the issue of new equity and the dividend- and split-adjusted stock return of all other biotech 
firms (included in our sample) in the 120 trading days prior to/ after the issue of new equity. Similar to 
DeAngelo et al (2010), we do not risk-adjust for firm-specific risk. The latter two measures refer to our measure 
of mispricing. Equal-weight index return refers to the managers’ perception of mispricing on market level, while 
abnormal stock return refers to the managers’ perception of mispricing on firm level. Reported p-values are the 
results of t test used to examine if there is a significant difference in the mean of the two samples (sample of 
equity issues and sample of no equity issues). Significance assessed using Games-Howell test, which does not 
assume balance samples or equality of variance. ***, **, and *, denote two-tail 1%, 5% and 10% significance, 
respectively. 
 
Mean-comparison test of the adverse selection cost hypothesis 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics regarding news announcements around the time of the 
issue of new equity. We measure the number of announcements made in the 90 calendar days 
preceding/following an announcement of a new share issue and test for differences between 
issuers (232 firm-quarter observations) and non-issuers (1989 firm-quarter observations). 
Table 4 contains results using positive, negative and combined measures of equal-weight 
announcements. For robustness reasons, we also employ phase-weight measures. The data 
suggests that biotech firms issue equity following the issuance of both positive and negative 
news announcements. Although positive announcements implicitly lead to higher capital 
requirement in order to initiate the next phase, i.e., firms need to make substantial 
investments to continue with their drug development, negative announcements do not. Ceteris 
paribus, the results provide support for the adverse selection cost hypothesis of equity market 
timing. As expected, there is no significant difference in news announcements subsequent of 
the issue of new equity. 
 Table 4. Announcements around the issue of equity 
  90 days before issue 90 days after issue 
 Number Mean Difference Mean Difference 
Panel A – Equal-weighted measures 
Positive outcome announcements 
Issuers of equity 232 0.2457 0.0923*** 0.1509 0.0030 
Non-issuers of equity 1989 0.1533 (0.010) 0.1478 (0.921) 
      
Negative outcome announcements 
Issuers of equity 232 0.1164 0.0661*** 0.0302 -0.0191 
Non-issuers of equity 1989 0.0503 (0.002) 0.0493 (0.252) 
      
Positive and negative announcements 
Issuers of equity 232 0.3621 0.1584*** 0.1810 -0.0160 
Non-issuers of equity 1989 0.2036 (0.000) 0.1971 (0.653) 
      
Panel B – Phase-weighted measures 
Positive outcome announcements 
Issuers of equity 232 0.4612 0.1716** 0.3103 0.0288 
Non-issuers of equity 1989 0.2896 (0.015) 0.2815 (0.650) 
      
Negative outcome announcements 
Issuers of equity 232 0.2112 0.1041** 0.0647 -0.0409 
Non-issuers of equity 1989 0.1071 (0.029) 0.1056 (0.283) 
      
Positive and negative announcements 
Issuers of equity 232 0.6724 0.2757*** 0.3750 -0.0121 
Non-issuers of equity 1989 0.3967 (0.003) 0.3871 (0.875) 
Notes: Reported p-values are the results of t test used to examine if there is a significant difference in the mean 
of the two samples (sample of equity issues and sample of no equity issues). Equally weighted positive 
(negative) outcome announcements is defined as the sum of announcements with a positive (negative) outcome, 
in which research phases are equally weighted. Phase-weight positive (negative) outcome announcements is the 
sum of announcements with a positive (negative) outcome, in which research phases are phase-weighted (i.e., 
phase I equals 1, phase II equals 2 and phase III equals 3). ***, **, and *, denote two-tail 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively. 
 
4.2 Determinants of the decision to issue new equity 
In this section, we examine whether the probability that biotech firms issue new equity is 
positively related to the survival time and the market-timing measures, mispricing and 
adverse selection costs. Similar to Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997) and DeAngelo et al et al. 
(2010), mispricing is measured using stock returns (PRE_FIRM_RET and 
PRE_INDEX_RET). Conversely, we follow Korajczyk et al. (1991) and Guo and Mech 
(2000) to study the probability of equity issues to adverse selection costs. However, positive 
and negative R&D announcements (R&D_NEWS_POS and R&D_NEWS_NEG) are used, 
rather than earnings and dividend announcements, as our proxy for adverse selection. Market 
 timing is expected to have incremental effects beyond those of survival time 
(SURVIVAL_TIME). Panel A of Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the regression 
analysis. 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics - Market timing when issuing new equity 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 St. dev 
ISSUE 1542 0.117    0.322 
SURVIVAL_TIME 1542 0.256 0.077 0.155 0.291 0.443 
PRE_FIRM_RET 1471 0.069 -0.198 0.051 0.350 0.461 
PRE_INDEX_RET 1542 -0.170 -0.512 -0.016 0.092 0.385 
POST_INDEX_RET 1498 -0.099 -0.376 -0.031 0.094 0.278 
R&D_NEWS_POS 1542 0.200    0.524 
R&D_NEWS_NEG 1542 0.070    0.353 
AGE 1542 6.033 2.736 5.250 8.586 4.233 
SIZE 1542 2.038 1.711 2.028 2.378 0.544 
MKTBOOK 1542 7.301 1.740 2.970 5.27 24.976 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The dependent 
variable (ISSUE) equals 1 when the firm quarter contains an announcement of an issue of new equity, otherwise 
0. SURVIVAL_TIME (measured on a quarterly basis) is computed as the inverse of the ratio of the sum of the 
company’s cash and short-term investments at the end of the previous quarter divided by the absolute value of 
the net income in the previous firm quarter. Firms that are profitable, or operate on a breakeven basis, are 
considered to have an infinite survival time, and hence, the inverse is zero. PRE_FIRM_RET, 
PRE_INDEX_RET, and, POST_INDEX_RET are measures of mispricing. PRE_FIRM_RET denotes abnormal 
stock return of the firm during the 120 trading days prior to an equity issue announcement. PRE_INDEX_RET 
denotes the stock return of all other biotech firms included in the sample in the 120 trading days prior to the 
issue of new equity. POST_INDEX_RET denotes the stock return of all other biotech firms included in the 
sample in the 120 trading days after the issue of new equity. R&D_NEWS_POS and R&D_NEWS_NEG are 
measures related to adverse selection cost. R&D_NEWS_POS (R&D_NEWS_NEG) is equally weighted 
positive (negative) outcome announcements and is defined as the sum of announcements with a positive 
(negative) outcome during the prior 90 trading days to the issue of new equity, in which research phases are 
equally weighted. AGE, SIZE, MKTBOOK, are control variables. AGE represents the number of months the 
firm has been publicly listed. SIZE represents firm size and is measured as the log of market value of equity. 
MKTBOOK represents market-to-book value of equity and is measured as the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity at the end of the previous quarter preceding the equity issue announcement. 
MKTBOOK is winsorized by three standard deviations. 
 
The average survival time is 11.7 months, which means that firms can sustain operations for a 
little less than one year before the cash balance falls to zero.
43
 PRE_INDEX_RET has a 
negative median value, which indicates that more than 50% of the firm-quarters contain 
negative returns for the average biotech firm. The mean public firm age is 6 years, indicating 
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 Survival time (SURVIVAL_TIME) is computed as the inverse of the ratio of the sum of the company’s cash 
and short-term investments at the end of the previous quarter divided by the absolute value of the net income in 
the previous firm quarter. A survival time of 0.256 is then equal to 3.9 firm quarters, or 11.7 firm months. 
 that biotech firms tend to be quite young. Finally, the standard deviation for the MKTBOOK 
variable is exceptionally high, even though it has been winsorized at three standard 
deviations. Panel B of Table 5 depicts the correlation between dependent and independent 
variables. We note, in particular, that the equity issue decision is positively associated with 
survival time, the prior index return, the post index return, negative R&D news and the 
biotech firm’s age. 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics - Market timing when issuing new equity 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
 
 ISSUE 
SURVIV
AL_ 
TIME 
PRE_FIR
M_RET 
PRE_IND
EX_RET 
POST_IN
DEX_RE
T 
R&D_NE
WS_POS 
R&D_NE
WS_NEG 
AGE SIZE 
MKTBO
OK 
ISSUE 1          
SURVIVAL_TIME 0.117*** 1         
PRE_FIRM_RET -0.016 -0.144*** 1        
PRE_INDEX_RET 0.072*** -0.040 -0.280*** 1       
POST_INDEX_RET 0.082*** -0.009 0.033 -0.032 1      
R&D_NEWS_POS 0.023 -0.021 0.040 -0.056** 0.042 1     
R&D_NEWS_NEG 0.059** -0.007 -0.031 -0.020 0.038 0.142*** 1    
AGE 0.075*** 0.085*** 0.027 0.032 0.054** 0.093*** 0.024 1   
SIZE -0.001 -0.254*** 0.241*** 0.149*** -0.067*** 0.115*** 0.028 0.109*** 1  
MKTBOOK 0.014 0.091*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.058** -0.011 0.005 0.103*** 0.046* 1 
Notes: The variables are detailed in Table 5, panel A. ***, **, and *, denote two-tail 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively. 
 
Table 6 presents the results from the probit regressions.
44
 The coefficient of survival time 
(SURVIVAL_TIME) is positive and significant at the 1% level in all models, indicating that 
biotech firms are more likely to issue equity when they have a near-term need of cash. The 
marginal effect indicates that an increase of one unit in survival time increases the probability 
of an equity issue by 9%. In model 2, the abnormal firm return is insignificant, which 
indicates that the biotech firm manager does not time equity issues when she believes that the 
firm is overvalued relative to other biotech firms. In models 3 and 4, we find support for H1, 
which states that biotech firms tend to issue new equity to a larger extent when market 
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 All analyses presented in Table 5 have also been performed on sub-samples containing rights offerings and 
private placements. Because many of these are intertwined, there are 43 rights offerings and 112 private 
placements found. The coefficients have the same sign in these two sub-samples, but the limited number of 
rights offerings removes most power from the statistical tests. In the private placement sample, 
SURVIVAL_TIME, PRE_INDEX_RET, POST_INDEX_RET and R&D_NEWS_NEG are all significant at the 
1% level.  
 sentiments are strong. Independent of the issuing firms’ performance, the coefficient on prior 
index return (PRE_INDEX_RET), measured using the equally weighted average of other 
biotech firms’ stock returns, is positive (z-statistic = 3.05) and indicates a marginal 
probability of 6.4%. 
Table 6. Market timing when issuing new equity 
                   
                                                     
                                                         
                                
 
   
 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
INTERCEPT  
-1.702*** 
(-9.05) 
-1.659*** 
(-8.58) 
-1.580*** 
(-8.33) 
-1.487*** 
(-7.45) 
-1.642*** 
(-8.56) 
       
SURVIVAL_TIME + 
0.471 
[0.090]*** 
(3.88) 
0.452 
[0.088]*** 
(3.87) 
0.474 
[0.089]*** 
(3.67) 
0.466 
[0.090]*** 
(3.77) 
0.642 
[0.117]*** 
(5.81) 
       
PRE_FIRM_RET +  
-0.007 
[-0.001] 
(-0.07) 
 
0.104 
[0.020] 
(0.99) 
 
       
PRE_INDEX_RET +   
0.342 
[0.064]*** 
(3.05) 
0.389 
[0.075]*** 
(3.21) 
0.432 
[0.079]*** 
(3.82) 
       
POST_INDEX_RET -     
0.591 
[0.108]*** 
(3.62) 
       
R&D_NEWS_POS +    
0.044 
[0.009] 
(0.51) 
0.026 
[0.005] 
(0.31) 
       
R&D_NEWS_NEG +    
0.200 
[0.038]** 
(2.08) 
0.195 
[0.036]** 
(2.08) 
       
AGE +/- 
0.023 
[0.004]** 
(2.22) 
0.019 
[0.004]* 
(1.81) 
0.023 
[0.004]** 
(2.28) 
0.019 
[0.004]* 
(1.72) 
0.018 
[0.003]* 
(1.71) 
       
SIZE +/- 
0.095 
[0.018] 
(1.12) 
0.090 
[0.018] 
(1.03) 
0.050 
[0.009] 
(0.59) 
0.013 
[0.002] 
(0.14) 
0.092 
[0.017] 
 (1.03) 
       
MKTBOOK +/- 
-0.001 
[-0.000] 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
[-0.000] 
(-0.43) 
-0.001 
[-0.000] 
(-0.28) 
-0.001 
[-0.000] 
(-0.33) 
-0.000 
[-0.001] 
(-0.17) 
       
Dummies for regions +/- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations  1542 1471 1542 1471 1498 
Pseudo R2  0.0363 0.0330 0.0443 0.0456 0.0609 
Notes: This table provides the estimates from the probit regressions. The sample consists of all seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) of all publicly listed European biotech firms during 1998-2010. The dependent variable equals 
1 when the firm quarter contains an announcement of an issue of new equity, otherwise 0. Coefficients are 
reported with z statistics in parentheses. SURVIVAL_TIME (measured on a quarterly basis) is computed as the 
inverse of the ratio of the sum of the company’s cash and short-term investments at the end of the previous 
quarter divided by the absolute value of the net income in the previous firm quarter. Firms that are profitable, or 
operate on a breakeven basis, are considered to have an infinite survival time, and hence, the inverse is zero. 
PRE_FIRM_RET, PRE_INDEX_RET, and, POST_INDEX_RET are measures of mispricing. PRE_FIRM_RET 
denotes abnormal stock return of the firm during the 120 trading days prior to an equity issue announcement. 
 PRE_INDEX_RET denotes the stock return of all other biotech firms included in the sample in the 120 trading 
days prior to the issue of new equity. POST_INDEX_RET denotes the stock return of all other biotech firms 
included in the sample in the 120 trading days after the issue of new equity. R&D_NEWS_POS and 
R&D_NEWS_NEG are measures related to adverse selection cost. R&D_NEWS_POS (R&D_NEWS_NEG) is 
equally weighted positive (negative) outcome announcements and is defined as the sum of announcements with 
a positive (negative) outcome during the prior 90 trading days to the issue of new equity, in which research 
phases are equally weighted. AGE, SIZE, MKTBOOK, and, region-dummies are control variables. AGE 
represents the number of months the firm has been publicly listed. SIZE represents firm size and is measured as 
the log of market value of equity. MKTBOOK represents market-to-book value of equity and is measured as the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the previous quarter preceding the 
equity issue announcement. MKTBOOK is winsorized by three standard deviations. We include region 
dummies as defined by La Porta et al (1998), which equal one if the firm is of French-, German-, or 
Scandinavian origin, otherwise zero (English-origin). We also control for risk (BETA) and intangible intensity 
(INT_INT). These measures are insignificant. However, we exclude them from the above regression due to a 
reduction in sample size due to missing data. We report coefficient estimates, marginal effects (within angle 
brackets), and, z-statistics for marginal effects (within brackets). All regressions contain robust standard errors. 
 
 
In models 4 and 5, we find support for the hypothesis (H2) that managers are more likely to 
issue equity when asymmetric information (or adverse selection costs) is relatively low. The 
coefficient of positive R&D news announcements (R&D_NEWS_POS) is positive, but 
insignificant. This is contrary to expectations because positive R&D announcements carries 
an investment need. However, the coefficient of negative R&D news announcement 
(R&D_NEWS_NEG) is positive (z-statistic = 2.07), supporting the adverse selection cost 
hypothesis. An increase of one unit in negative R&D news (R&D_NEWS_NEG) increases the 
probability of an equity issuance by 3.8%. In model 5, the coefficient of the post index return 
(POST_INDEX_RET) is positive and significant. This indicates that biotech firms make new 
share issues well before the end of a period with positive market sentiments. 
In untabulated tests, we follow Ai and Norton (2003) and interact survival time with prior 
index return and negative R&D news announcements. Although both the survival time and 
prior index return are statistically significant at 1% level, their interaction term is 
insignificant (z-statistic = 0.27). In contrast, the interaction term between survival time and 
negative R&D news is positive and significant (z-statistic = 2.00). This implies that when 
firms running out of cash release negative R&D news, they are particularly likely to issue 
new equity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
When regulatory authorities, such as the FDA and the EMA, publicly announce the progress 
of research projects, they provide highly relevant information to investors analyzing biotech 
firms (Jeppsson, 2010). However, investors receive not only relevant information about 
 future cash flows but also exceptionally credible news announcements. Past studies of market 
timing in relation to actions such as earnings announcements are biased in the case that 
managers deliberately disclose information that is at their advantage. In comparison with 
previous studies on the mispricing theory and particularly those on the adverse selection cost 
theory, our measures are essentially unaffected by managerial discretion.  
The empirical study is based on 87 biotech firms listed across Europe in the years 1998 
through 2009. In total, these firms offered 232 issues of new equity and 561 publicly 
disclosed announcements about the progress of their research projects. We find strong 
support for both the mispricing and adverse selection cost theories. They are highly 
significant explanatory factors on a stand-alone basis, but, interestingly, they also contain 
some incremental explanatory power. New equity is issued to a considerably greater extent 
when market sentiments in the biotech industry are strong. It is notable that a firm’s abnormal 
return is unassociated with the equity announcement. This suggests either that there is no 
opportunistic disclosure of firm-specific information or that it has had no effect on pricing. 
We also note that market sentiments in the biotech industry continue to be strong following 
the equity announcement and thus that many of the issues of new equity are made in the 
middle of quite extensive time periods when market sentiments are positive. 
The adverse selection cost theory suggests that rational managers decide to issue new equity 
when there is relatively little asymmetric information between shareholders and management. 
Mean-comparison tests suggest that news of both positive and negative character is 
associated with issues of new equity. However, in the multivariate tests positive news 
announcements have no incremental positive effect on equity issues. This is quite surprising, 
given that positive news not only contains credible signals of the biotech firm having value-
creating projects but also tends to force biotech firms to increase their investment rate. 
Announcements of negative news do not necessarily carry these side effects; we thus see their 
positive significant association with the issuance of equity as solid support for the adverse 
selection hypothesis. 
It needs to be mentioned that, overall, a firm’s survival time is the best indicator of a new 
equity issue. On average, firms that issue new equity can sustain their ongoing operations less 
than a year. 
The biotech industry is, arguably, different from other industries in the sense that firms 
usually operate with large negative free cash flows and have no other choice but to regularly 
 ask investors for (equity) financing of their research projects. From an investor perspective, 
there is considerable asymmetric information and, given the inherent risk of the industry, a 
search for credible signals of a biotech firm’s prospects seems to be a clear-cut requirement 
before buying into an issue of new shares. Although an investor’s search for credible signals 
is particularly important in this setting, we are convinced that it is not unique to the biotech 
industry. In other words, our findings lend support for studying market timing not only from 
the point of view that managers want to capitalize on mispricing but also from the point of 
view that they rationally go to equity markets when there is a chance that investors will 
understand the firm’s prospects better. In the last decade, a vast amount of empirical support 
has been given to the idea that market timing is about opportunistic managers trying to 
capitalize on moments when markets are mispriced. The adverse selection cost theory seems 
to be, if not an equally important factor, at least a less-than-marginal factor to be considered 
when understanding firms’ decisions to finance their ventures. 
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